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INTRODUCTION

International human rights law has greatly expanded since World
War II. Advocates argue that it should supplement and even displace
the domestic lawmaking process in a wide range of settings. Such displacement would be desirable if international human rights law were
likely to provide legal norms that are on average superior to those
produced by domestic lawmaking processes. Unfortunately, the opposite is likely to be the case when international human rights law norms
are used as authority to displace domestic law that would otherwise
govern liberal democratic states.
As we have discussed in an earlier article,' most international law
is made through highly undemocratic procedures.2 These processes
lack the advantages of democratic processes, and have few, if any, off-

59

1 John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law,
1175 (2007).

STAN. L. REV.

2

Id. at 1193-95.
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setting virtues of their own. Thus, on average, the quality of what we
call "raw" international law rules that have not been ratified by domestic democratic processes is likely to be lower than that of domestic
legal rules established by liberal democracies. 3 By contrast, international law that has been validated by the domestic lawmaking process
of a democracy-either through ordinary legislation or treaty ratification-should on average be as good as other laws enacted by the same
4
domestic processes.
In this Article, we extend our analysis of democracy and raw international law to the special case of international human rights law,
including international humanitarian law. In that area, advocates of
human rights law argue that international law has a special role to play
because such rights are too fundamental to be left to the vagaries of
domestic democratic processes. We demonstrate, however, that there
is good reason for skepticism about the desirability of using international human rights law to change the domestic human rights law of
democratic nations.
Our analysis rests on both theory and example. As a matter of
theory we show how domestic democratic processes are likely to generate human rights norms superior to those embodied in international law. International law is often enacted through the influence of
nondemocratic governments and unaccountable, unrepresentative
elites from democratic states. Even the assent of democratic governments to international human rights norms is often "cheap talk,"
because that assent does not reflect a willingness to have these norms
directly enforced. We also show that many specific international
human rights norms are at best debatable and at worse potentially
harmful. One of the key structural problems is that the institutions
interpreting such norms are not democratic, but bureaucratic and oligarchic and, thus, often hostile to basic economic and personal
liberties.
We do not argue against the use of international human rights
law to replace democratic decisionmaking because democracy produces perfect results. We merely contend that even a flawed democratic process is likely to produce better legal rules than the
international lawmaking system. The democratic process to some
degree reflects the decisions of the people either directly or, more
often, through their representatives. The international law system, by
contrast, reflects the views of national governments, whether demo3

For a discussion of the difference between raw and ratified international law,

see id. at 1176-77.

4

Id. at 1176.
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cratic or not, and unelected publicists, who are accountable to no
one. There is no good reason to believe that such a process will better
choose appropriate human rights, including minority rights, than a
democracy will. This is particularly clear if one includes the constitution-making processes of complex, modem democracies as part of the
domestic lawmaking system.
Nevertheless, our conclusions about international human rights
law are not wholly negative. Our emphasis on democracy leads to
qualified enthusiasm about the role human rights law can play in
restricting the abuse of government power by nondemocratic regimes.
Moreover, our embrace of democratic processes as a relatively effective generator of human rights naturally leads to a willingness to consider domestic enforcement of international human rights that
directly strengthen citizens' control over government policy. We thus
seek to reorient international human rights law from the generation
of controversial substantive rights to protection of norms that will
facilitate the leverage of citizens in controlling their own governments. In short, because there is no global democratic process, international law lacks the ability to generate substantive rights norms
superior to those of democratic states. Thus, international human
rights law might better focus on creating rights that facilitate rather
than supplant domestic democratic processes.
Such a reorientation is particularly defensible in cases where
international human rights law seeks to displace the domestic law of
democratic states, which are likely to generate better laws through
their democratic processes than those enacted through international
law. 5 As an example of international human rights law that may facili-

tate such leverage, we advocate rights that empower citizens to vote
with their feet through free migration.
Part I of this Article describes the wide range of situations in
which advocates of international human rights law justify the use of
these norms to displace the domestic law of democracies. Part II
responds to the claim that human rights law is best developed through
international lawmaking processes by explaining the advantages of
democratic processes in formulating human rights law relative to
nondemocratic alternatives. In Part III, we show why international
human rights law suffers from a democracy deficit. This deficit exists
whether the international law is embedded in multilateral human
rights treaties, in customary international law, or in softer international law norms created by international organizations. Much of
5 As we suggest in Part VI, there may be stronger justification for allowing international human rights law to displace the substantive law of authoritarian states.
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international human rights law is made either by relatively unaccountable international elites or through processes in which the governments of oppressive dictatorships wield influence. Allowing such
international law to displace the domestic lawmaking process in democratic states is more likely to cause harm than good because the legislative processes that generate international law are generally inferior
to those of well-functioning democracies. In addition, subordinating
the law of various nations to a single international standard could
close off valuable diversity and experimentation.
Part IV provides concrete examples of the democracy deficit at
work. We consider specific norms of international human rights law
generated by international institutions and show that they are deeply
controversial and potentially highly flawed. These rights are largely
generated by international bureaucrats, including many representing
authoritarian governments. Not surprisingly, some of these norms are
inimical to personal and economic liberties that can themselves be
categorized as important human rights. The subset of international
rights law known as humanitarian law is also defective in a similar way.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is a private
organization made up of citizens from a single country that is focused
on expanding the reach of humanitarian law through its interpretations of the Geneva Convention and customary international law. 6
But this expansion is potentially at the expense of permitting nations,
like the United States, to prosecute necessary wars, including a war
against terror-a prosecution that itself may protect human liberty. It
is a striking confirmation of the lack of attention to the democracy
deficit in international human rights law that the parochial nature of
the ICRC is hardly mentioned, let alone evaluated, in previous discussions of whether domestic institutions in the United States and elsewhere should defer to its legal judgments.
In Part V, we sketch a new theory of representation-reinforcing
international human rights law that is not as open to the democracy
deficit objections as conventional approaches. Our argument is conceptually similar to John Hart Ely's classic justification of representation-reinforcing elements of judicial review. 7 Just as Ely argued that
domestic judicial review might avoid the dangers of countermajoritarianism if it helped to facilitate democratic representation, 8 we contend
that the democracy deficit of international human rights law might be
obviated in cases where the international legal rules in question actu6
7
8

See infra Part III.D.2.
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST

Id. at 101-04.

87-88 (1980).
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ally promote democracy by increasing the ability of the people to
exercise control over the government policies under which they live.
Ultimately, democracy is itself an institution dependent on legal
norms. Precisely because human rights are best developed through
democratic systems, international norms that facilitate democracy
have a claim to be enforced domestically.
It might be thought that representation reinforcement cannot be
usefully applied to democracies. Well-established democracies, almost
by definition, provide rights that reinforce democracy in their own
nations and, to a lesser extent, abroad. For instance, free speech
rights not only help circulate ideas within democratic nations, but
have also historically provided a platform for refugees from dictatorships to influence the nations from which they have fled.
But even democratic nations could do more to promote representation-reinforcing rights. Most importantly, exit and entry rights
enable citizens to vote with their feet for their preferred government
policies. Unlike many other forms of international human rights law,
migration rights strengthen democratic accountability by giving citizens an alternative means of influencing government policy, one
which has some advantages over traditional ballot box voting. Migration rights are also unlikely to prevent diversity and experimentation
in government policy in the way that the imposition of other substantive international human rights norms might. Obviously, migration
rights are not the only possible form of representation-reinforcing
international human rights law. There may well be other examples.
Nonetheless, we put forward several reasons why migration rights are
stronger candidates for enforcement through international human
rights law than most others that might be suggested.
Our Conclusion briefly explores some of the broader implications of our thesis. We suggest that international human rights law
should be more aggressively used to displace the domestic law of dictatorships than liberal democracies. Although the political processes
that generate international human rights law are likely to produce less
desirable outcomes than the domestic lawmaking processes of democracies, they may well be superior to those of dictatorships. In extreme
cases, such as that of totalitarian states, almost any alternative legal
regime is likely to be superior to that established by the state's domestic rulers. Finally, we emphasize that our skepticism about raw international human rights law does not apply to international human
rights norms that have been duly ratified by domestic lawmaking
processes in democratic states.
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International human rights law has greatly expanded in scope
since World War 11. 9 Unfortunately, the process for its generation has
not fundamentally improved, remaining substantially undemocratic.
Despite these defects, advocates increasingly urge that nations rely on
the authority of international human rights law to create domestic
rules of decision.i 0 We believe that such reliance is a mistake, because
the process for generating international human rights is currently
inferior to the domestic process in well-functioning democracies. We
recognize that many principles that happen to be part of international
human rights laws may well be beneficial, but their presence in international human rights law itself, given its deficient production process, does not provide sufficient evidence of their beneficence.
Accordingly, international human rights law should not be used as an
authority in well-functioning democracies that are capable of choosing sound principles through their own superior domestic processes.
In this Part, we first briefly describe the growing scope of international human rights law. We then describe the many ways in which
advocates of international human rights argue that this body of law
should be used as authority to create domestic rules of decision. In
the Parts following this one, we complete our basic analytic framework
by showing that democracy is important to generating human rights
and that international human rights law has a democracy deficit.
A.

The Growing Scope of InternationalHuman Rights Law

The expansion of international human rights law that began at
the close of World War II continues today. "First generation" international human rights were focused on the basic requisites of civil and
democratic society, such as free speech.1 1 But so-called "second generation" rights are social and economic in nature, including "positive"
rights against the government, such as the right to employment or
housing. 12 "Third generation" rights focus on the interests of society
13
as a whole, such as the right to sustainable development.
9 See Jenny S. Martinez, Antislavery Courts and the Dawn of International Human
Rights Law, 117 YALE L.J. 550, 554 (2008).
10 See Margaret E. McGuinness, Medellfn, Norm Portals, and the HorizontalIntegration of InternationalHuman Rights, 82 NOTE DAME L. REv. 755, 830 (2006).
11 See Katherine R. Miller, PlaygroundPolitics:Assessing the Wisdom of Writing a Reciprocity Requirement into U.S. International Recognition and Enforcement Law, 35 GEO. J.
INT'L L. 239, 308 n.376 (2004).
12 Id.
13 Id.
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Accordingly, the trend in international human rights laws has
moved from rights about which there is more consensus to rights
about which there is less, and from rights which have a fairly definable
core, like free speech, to those that are quite difficult to define, such
as sustainable development. Moreover, by their very nature, positive
rights to government-provided resources can conflict with negative
individual rights to liberty and property.
Besides the expansion and potential conflicts created by whole
new categories of rights, the range of international human rights
norms now accepted or espoused is quite breathtaking. Such rights
5
include the right to health care1 4 and the right to affirmative action.'
Other rights impose duties on third-party nations, such as the right of
protection from genocide.1 6 Some of these goals, like affirmative
action, are controversial even as policy matters. Others, such as
increasing the availability of health care, may be desirable policy
objectives, but nevertheless raise questions about whether it is wise or
prudent to categorize these goals as rights that may trump other con7
siderations, including budgetary constraints.'

14 Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 25, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); see alsoJason B. Saunders,
Note, InternationalHealth Care: Will the United States Ever Adopt Health Carefor All?-A
Comparison Between Proposed United States Approaches to Health Care and the Single-Source
FinancingSystems of Denmark and the Netherlands, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 711,

713-16 (1995) (noting the recognition of health care as a fundamental right under
international law).
15 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 2, § 2, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. C, 95-2 (1978), 660
U.N.T.S. 195; see also Jordan J. Paust, Race-Based Affirmative Action and International
Law, 18 MicH.J. INT'L L. 659, 659 (1997) (claiming that race-based affirmative action
in higher education is affirmed by treaty law). Justice Ginsburg also relied on this
right in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
16 See David Aronofsky, The InternationalLegal Responsibility to Protect Against Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: Why NationalSovereignty Does Not Preclude
Its Exercise, 13 ILSAJ. INT'L & COMp. L. 317, 317-19 (2007).
17 Of course, not everyone agrees with the claims of the more aggressive advocates of international human rights law. But, as we discuss below, one of the problems
of international human rights law is that the materials from which international rights
norms are formulated are less clear and the bodies charged with formulating human
rights law less disciplined than their counterparts in the domestic process. Thus, that
the content of international human rights is the subject of sharp disagreement is
another reason for arguing it should not displace domestic law.
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InternationalHuman Rights Law as a Justificationfor Changing
Domestic Law

As international human rights law has expanded in scope, so too
has interest grown in using this web of international law to displace
the domestic lawmaking process. International human rights law can
enter the domestic sphere in a variety of ways. First, advocates have
suggested that domestic courts apply international human rights law
directly, incorporating it into a domestic regime without the decisions
of the democratic legislative processes. Second, international human
rights law can displace the domestic lawmaking process indirectly by
being used as a rule of construction in determining the meaning of
constitutions and statutes. Finally, the authority of international
human rights law can be used to justify changes in domestic law
enacted through the ordinary legislative process. We will discuss each
of these routes of international human rights incorporation in turn.
We distinguish here between the use of international human
rights law as an authority in its own right and appeals to principles
that just happen to be part of international human rights law. We do
not claim that principles contained in international human rights law
are necessarily bad ones, but merely that reliance on international
human rights law as an independently valid source of authority for
construing domestic law is unsound.
1. Direct Incorporation of Human Rights Law into Domestic Law
Without Legislative Warrant
The most direct route to incorporating international human
rights law into domestic law is to argue that international law is an
integral part of domestic jurisprudence-even if that law is not part of
a ratified treaty. In the United States, the doctrinal basis for such a
move is the slogan "[i] nternational law is part of our law," taken from
the Supreme Court's famous decision in The Paquete Habana.I 8 Advocates therefore argue that international human rights law, if incorporated into international custom, is equal in authority to domestic law
in the United States.' 9 A similar argument that customary interna-

18 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
19 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw as Law in the United States, 82 MIcH. L.
REv. 1555, 1566 (1984). We discuss the complex legal status of the Paquete Habanain
American law at much greater length in McGinnis & Somin, supranote 1, at 1188-92.
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tional law is part of domestic law can be made in many other demo20
cratic nations.
The extent to which courts in the United States are likely to
accept this argument in the near future is open to debate. 2 1 But its
popularity in the academic world suggests that it will remain a tempting possibility. 22 For reasons described below, we believe the temptation should be resisted.
2.

International Human Rights Law as a Rule of Construction for
Domestic Law

More indirect methods of incorporating international human
rights into domestic law are already bearing fruit. Courts can rely on
international human rights law to construe domestic law, even if they
are not making international human rights law a completely independent domestic rule of decision. International human rights law can
be used as a principle of construction both at the constitutional and
statutory levels. This kind of use of international human rights law
has been endorsed by the leading academic treatise on the subject. 23
It is important to recognize that this use of international law ultimately displaces domestic lawmaking processes no less than direct
judicial incorporation of international law. If the use of international
law as a rule of construction alters the legal rules judges impose, it will
lead to the establishment of a different legal rule from that which
would have emerged from domestic political decisionmaking alone.
If it does not affect either case outcomes or the rules underpinning
them, then it will be entirely superfluous. In at least some cases, how20 The Netherlands is an example. See, e.g., John C. Penn, Sexual Harassment:
ProscriptivePolicies of the European Community, Ireland, and New Zealand, 6 Am. U. J. GENDER & L. 139, 156 n.113 (1997).

21 A recently decided case, Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008), underscores
those doubts. In deciding that the treaty at issue in the case was not self-executing,
Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that political branches, not the judiciary, should
determine the existence and scope of the international obligations of the United
States. See id. at 1358.
22 See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary InternationalLaw by the Executive Unconstitutional?,80 Nw. U. L. REv. 321, 325
(1985) (suggesting that customary international law places limits on the President);
Jules Lobel, The Limits of ConstitutionalPower: Conflicts Between ForeignPolicy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1075 (1985) (stating that neither the President nor
Congress has the power to violate norms of international law); Jordan J. Paust, The
President Is Bound by International Law, 81 Am. J. INT'L L. 377, 378 (1987) (declaring
"emphatically" that the President cannot violate customary international law).
23 See HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT
1098-108 (3d ed. 2008).
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ever, the use of international human rights law as a rule of construction will have an impact. Otherwise, it is difficult to understand the
broad enthusiasm for this approach among those who advocate
24
expanding the influence of international law.

In the United States, in Roper v. Simmons, 2 5 the Supreme Court
cited the Convention on the Rights of the Child 26 as evidence of international consensus against the execution ofjuveniles, thereby helping
to justify its interpretation of the U.S. Constitution as banning that
practice. 27 Yet the United States, which has signed the Convention,
never ratified it.28 In addition, the Court cited the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 29 even though the United States

had entered a formal reservation against the Covenant's anti-death
penalty provision.3 0 Thus, the Court relied on international human
rights law documents that the political branches had expressly refused
to incorporate into domestic law.
We recognize that this is not an unambiguous use of international human rights law, because the Court did not declare that executing juveniles was against international human rights law, but simply
deployed evidence from human rights treaties to reach its conclusion.
Nevertheless, several Supreme Court Justices have expressed enthusiasm for the use of international human rights law in constitutional
interpretation. 31 Academics are even more insistent that integrating
24 See, e.g., David Golove, Military 7ribunals, InternationalLaw, and the Constitution:
A Franckian-MadisonianApproach, 35 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 363, 370 (2003) (discussing and approving the rationale for construing constitutional powers in light of international law); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance,
Engagement, 119 HARv. L. REv. 109, 124 (2005) (discussing benefits for construing the
Constitution in light of international law).
25 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
26 Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3.
27 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 576.
28 See id.; Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties (June 9, 2004), http://
www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.
29 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 576; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 6(5), adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ("Sentence of death shall not
be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age . . ").
30 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 622-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("'The United States
reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person ... including such punishment for crimes committed by persons
below eighteen years of age.'" (quoting S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-23, at 11 (1992))).
31 See Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Keynote Address at the
Ninety-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 4,
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international human rights law into our fundamental law is necessary
to ensure that judicial interpretations of the U.S. Constitution reflect
32
the values of the wider world community.
Nor is this approach limited to the United States. In a recent
article, Professor Melissa Waters has shown that the courts of other
nations whose constitutions, like ours, do not directly incorporate
international law into their domestic jurisprudence are starting to
interpret their constitutions as congruent with multilateral international human rights treaties. 3 3 For instance, they are beginning to use
34
these treaties to resolve alleged ambiguities in constitutional rights.

They also may use them to limit constitutionally granted legislative
power where a contrary construction might violate international
human rights law. 3 5 Professor Waters suggests that this trend "could
effectively result in the subordination of all domestic law to international human rights law." 36 We certainly do not believe that such total
subordination is likely to happen soon. But the trend is significant
enough to require evaluation before reaching the possible culmination envisioned by Professor Waters. This tendency is also consonant
with one noted by political scientists: political and social elites are
reacting to the rise of potentially hostile political forces constructing
more powerful and wide-ranging roles for the judiciary, because in
37
judicial fora they retain substantial influence.
Another method for integrating international human rights law
into domestic jurisprudence is to require that domestic legislation be
interpreted consistently with international law wherever possible. In
the United States, advocates who argue this approach gain support
from ancient Supreme Court precedent, like Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy, 38 that seeks to harmonize, wherever possible, Ameri2003), in 97 Am. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 265, 265 (2003); Sandra Day O'Connor, Assoc.
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Keynote Address at the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of
the American Society of International Law (Mar. 16, 2002), in 96 AM. Soc'v INT'L L.
PROC. 348, 350 (2002) ("[C]onclusions reached by ...
the international community
should at times constitute persuasive authority in American courts.").
32 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, InternationalLaw as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J.
INT'L L. 43, 52-57 (2004).
33 See Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretative
Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 628, 686 (2007).
34

Id. at 683.

35

Id.

36

Id. at 686.

37

See, e.g., RAN HIRSCHL, ToWARDsJums-rocRAcv 11-12 (2004).

38

6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
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can statutory law with the norms of the wider world. 39 In particular,
modern international human rights advocates suggest that the statutory authority on which the President relies in military and law
enforcement operations in the War on Terror should be interpreted
against the background of a complex web of international human
rights law and international humanitarian law. 40 Such interpretations
would constrain the President's authority by requiring that it be exercised in accordance with purported international norms.
3.

International Human Rights Law as an Authority Justifying
Legal Change

Finally, international human rights norms may be used as authority to justify change in the domestic regulations, statutes, or constitutions of democratic nations. Many have seen this avenue as the best
way to internalize international human rights norms in domestic law.
For instance, Harold Hongju Koh has suggested that nation states
establish bureaucratic units devoted to such integration. 41 The Office
of the Legal Advisor to the Department of State provides an example
of a bureaucracy focused on international law integration in the
United States. 42 Besides this mode of bureaucratic integration, international human rights norms could be relied upon as authority more
generally in legislative deliberation about appropriate policy.
Arguing for the adoption of principles that happen to be in international human rights law on the basis of moral or pragmatic considerations is, of course, completely consistent with ordinary democratic
discourse and deliberation. Our objections are limited to the use of
international human rights law as an authority independent of other
considerations. Consider this analogy: we would be wary of relying,
either in the judiciary or in the legislature, on propositions from the
Bible or the Koran on the basis of their intrinsic authority, even if
many of the normative propositions in these works also have sound
pragmatic justifications on which legislatures should and do rely.4 3
Insofar as advocates argue that the laws of democratic nations, including the United States, should converge with international human
39 See Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force, InternationalLaw,
and the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. Rv. 293, 330-33 (2005).
40 Id. at 332-33.
41 See Harold Hongju Koh, How Is InternationalHuman Rights Law Enforced?, 74
IND.

LJ. 1397, 1410 (1999).

42 See id. As this article goes to press, Dean Koh has been appointed to the position of Legal Advisor to the Department of State by President Barack Obama.
43 See John 0. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 303,
310-11 (2006).
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rights law merely because such convergence is intrinsically good, it is
important to examine whether the process that generates international human rights lawjustifies such an appeal to authority. We turn
to that question below.
II.

ADVANTAGES OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES IN FORMULATING

HuMAN

RIGHTS LAW

This Part explains the benefits of democratic processes as a
means for determining the content of human rights law. We start by
briefly summarizing the most important general advantages of democratic lawmaking relative to authoritarianism and oligarchy. We then
consider the important argument that human rights law in particular
should not be developed by democratic processes because it is
intended to constrain democracy. Despite some significant shortcomings, however, even human rights law developed by purely
majoritarian democratic processes is likely to be preferable to
nondemocratic alternatives. Moreover, some of the disadvantages of
using purely majoritarian democratic processes to formulate human
rights law can be reduced by resorting to a different kind of democratic mechanism-supermajoritarian constitutional lawmaking.
Obviously, there is a longstanding debate over the definition of
democracy. For our purposes, we define democracy in the minimalist
sense popularized by Joseph Schumpeter: a political regime in which
voters have the power to change rulers through regular, free elections. 44 We do not contend that minimalistic Schumpeterian democracy is the best possible democratic process, but merely that a polity
that meets Schumpeter's criterion is likely to, on average, produce
better human rights norms than the international lawmaking process.
Even under the minimalistic definition of democracy advanced
here, some governments are not clearly either democratic or undemocratic. For example, Freedom House's annual survey of political freedom around the world, which uses criteria roughly similar to ours,
classifies numerous nations as "partly free. '4 5 Our argument suggests
that international human rights law is highly unlikely to produce better norms than those developed by the domestic lawmaking processes
44 SeeJosEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 250, 270-72
(Harper Colophon Books 1976) (1942).
45 See Press Release, Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2009: Freedom

Retreats for Third Year (Jan. 12, 2009), available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/
template.cfm?page=70&release=756 ("The number of Partly Free countries is 62, or
32 percent of all countries assessed by the survey and 20 percent of the world's total
population.").
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of well-established democracies. With respect to partly democratic
nations, it implies that the more democratic they are in our sense of
the term, the more likely they are to produce better human rights
policies than those generated by international law. We suggest that
the overriding of domestic law by international human rights law may
be more defensible in the case of authoritarian states or partly democratic nations that are relatively close to the authoritarian end of the
46
spectrum.
A.

General Benefits of Democratic Processes

Democracy provides an important justification for legal norms,
including human rights, for several reasons. First, many political theorists argue that democratic control of government policy has intrinsic
value. 47 If the governed do not have any meaningful control over
their rulers, it is far from clear that the latter have any inherent right
to wield the power that they possess. Second, even if democratic control has little or no inherent worth, it still has considerable instrumental benefits. Citizens are likely to be better off under a government
subject to democratic checks than under one in which they are largely
absent. 48 More generally, democracy serves as a check on self-dealing
by political elites. It helps ensure, at least to some extent, that leaders
enact policies that serve the interests of their people, because the
leaders' continuing right to govern is directly dependent on the peo49
ple's expressed preferences.

Under some conditions and assumptions, democratic governance
may not only protect the public against self-dealing elites, but also
increases the likelihood that political institutions will reach "correct"
decisions on crucial issues. The CondorcetJury Theorem is the most
famous theory asserting this possibility. The theorem assumes that the
two alternatives from which voters choose have an equal a priori
chance of being true. 50 It then holds that when individuals in a group
make decisions independently of one another about the truth of pro46
47

See infra notes 224-28 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 117-20 (2003); CAROLE
PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 4-5 (1970).
48 For a recent summary of the evidence, see MORTON H. HALPERIN ET AL., THE
DEMOCRACY ADVANTAGE 25-64, 93-134 (2005).
49 For example, it is striking that no democratic nation, no matter how poor, has
ever had a mass famine within its borders, whereas such events are common in
authoritarian and totalitarian states. SeeAMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 178
(1999) (famously noting that "there has never been a famine in a functioning multiparty democracy").
50 See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 129-30 (2003).
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positions and each has a greater than fifty percent accuracy rate, the
decision reached by the majority is likely to assess the truth of the
proposition correctly.

51

Others have applied the Condorcet Theorem as an argument for
majority rule in the legislature. 5 2 In order to translate the theory to
the legislative context, however, one needs to make one of two additional assumptions, because the Condorcet Theorem assumes a search
for objective truth. One possible assumption is that legislators, at least
in part, have a common view of the public interest, and perhaps some
understanding of efficiency. 53 An alternative assumption is that factual predictions about the likely results of legislation are important to
evaluating whether to vote yes or no on legislation. We think both of
these assumptions are warranted, at least under some circumstances,
and that the Condorcet Theorem thus sheds some light on the actions
of legislators. We caution, however, that a preference model of legislation, discussed above, where legislators vote based on some combiconstituents,
nation of their preferences and the preferences of their
54
process.
legislative
the
of
reality
the
of
more
captures
Under the Condorcet paradigm, majority rule is more likely to
result in better decisionmaking than are insular institutions isolated
from democratic control when determining what rights are actually in
the public interest. One important exception to this proposition is
that experts may reach better decisions than democracy if each individual voter in the democratic process is less than fifty percent likely
to reach the right decision. Systematic biases in voter deliberations
can cause such an outcome. 55 Even in this case, however, the experts
may not outperform the democratic process if they lack proper incentives to pursue beneficial policies.
Obviously, democratic processes also have weaknesses. Widespread political ignorance and irrationality often prevent voters from
monitoring government and make the enactment of flawed policies
51 See id.
52 Prominent among legal theorists are Frank I. Michelman andJeremy Waldron.
See David M. Estlund, Jeremy Waldron, Bernard Grofman, & Scott L. Feld, Democratic
Theory and the Public Interest: Condorcet and Rousseau Revisited, 83 Am. POL. Sci. REv.
1317, 1317-28 (1989); Frank I. Michelman, Why Voting?, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 985,
995-96 (2001) (offering the CondorcetJury Theorem as part of the epistemicjustification for majority rule).
53 See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Condorcet Case for
Supermajority Rules, 16 Sup. CT. ECON. REv. 67, 73, 103 (2008).
54 For a discussion of other assumptions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem as
applied to legislatures, see id. at 102.

55

See, e.g.,

BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER

23-49 (2007)

(describing a variety of systematic biases that may lead voters to error).
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more likely. 56 The disproportionate power of organized interest
groups allows them to "capture" the democratic process and use it in
ways that sometimes harm the interests of the general public. 5 7 For
these and other reasons, democratic government may often be inferior to market or civil society institutions. 58 For our purposes, however,
the important point is that democratic processes are generally superior to nondemocratic policymaking by government. It simply does
not follow from the weaknesses of democracy that nondemocratic governments perform better. Extensive evidence suggests that democratic political processes generally produce better outcomes on a wide
59
range of indicators than do nondemocratic ones.
B.

Is Human Rights Law Special?

Some might concede the above points for most areas of public
policy but suggest that concern over the democracy deficit of human
rights law is misplaced, because human rights are by nature universal,
natural, and countermajoritarian. Because rights are natural and universal, their validity does not depend on endorsement by any particular political process. Because rights are restrictions on democratic
governments, their content should not be left up to the democratic
process.
We do not have space to extensively address the metaphysical status of human rights. But we do observe that individuals have disagreed on the content and scope of these rights since the issue first
arose centuries ago. 60 Indeed, at times some human rights claims
have been in sharp tension with others. For instance, individual nega56 See Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the CountermajoritarianDifficulty: A New
Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REv. 1287, 1291
(2004) [hereinafter Somin, PoliticalIgnorance]; Ilya Somin, Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal, 12 CRITICAL REV. 413, 415-33 (1998) [hereinafter Somin, Voter Ignorance].
On the political irrationality of many voters, see CAPLAN, supra note 55.
57 For a helpful summary of the arguments on this point, see WILLIAM C. MITCHELL & RANDY T. SIMMONS, BEYOND POLITICS 102-75 (1994). For a good recent survey

of the literature on interest group power and its impact, see

MUELLER,

supra note 50,

at 347-53, 481-89, 497-500.
58 See, e.g., DAVID SCHMIDTZ, THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT 103-04, 132-33 (1991)

(arguing that the private sector will often perform better than democratic government in providing public goods); Somin, Voter Ignorance, supra note 56, at 431-35
(arguing that political ignorance justifies reducing the role of government in society).

59 See HALPERIN ET AL., supra note 48, at 12-15.
60 Thus, we take no position on whether rights are, in some sense, natural or
human constructs-rules of thumb that have been discovered to promote human
flourishing.
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tive rights to liberty are often in tension with positive rights of individ61
uals to resources provided by the government.
Thus whether or not human rights are universal, a key question
for human rights remains epistemic: how are we to know what is the
"right" content of human rights law? Accordingly, whatever the metaphysical status of rights, citizens need a process to determine what
rights the law should enforce. Given that the process is likely to be
run by the institution of government, democratic processes tend to be
superior to the available authoritarian and oligarchic alternatives.
While, as we discuss below, we do not believe that governments
should necessarily limit themselves to majority rule in determining
what the content of legally enforceable human rights is, there are reasons that majority rule is likely to prove better than authoritarian or
oligarchic mechanisms in choosing the content of human rights to be
protected by law. Majority rule has virtues that can help maximize
62
citizens' welfare. One is rooted in a preference analysis of voting. If
each voter supports laws that provide him or her with net benefits,
then the laws supported by the majority should produce total benefits
that exceed total costs, because the benefits to the greater number of
63
people in the majority will exceed the costs to the minority.
A second advantage of majority rule in determining human rights
is implicit in the Condorcet theorem. 64 If each individual voter is fifty
percent or more likely to choose the "correct" package of human
rights, a majority-rule process will be more likely to reach the right
65
result than will other methods of decisionmaking.
We recognize that majoritarian democracy has shortcomings as a
mechanism for determining the content of human rights. For
instance, majorities may consistently outvote certain religious minorities and forbid them from engaging in practices that are very important to them, simply because they are distasteful the majority. In the
next subpart we will consider the role of nonmajoritarian political
structures in protecting human rights. These alternatives, however,
61 The clash between these two types of rights claims is a major focus of modern
political philosophy. See, e.g., JOHN E. ROEMER, THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
(1998) (surveying much of the relevant literature).
62 See MICHELMAN, supra note 52, at 994-96 (discussing preference model of
voting).
63 We recognize that this argument assumes, however, that the average cost
imposed on people harmed by the law does not exceed the average benefit to people
helped by it; otherwise, the majority might pass a law that provides small benefits to
itself, but imposes much larger costs on the minority. As we describe in Part II.C,
supermajoritarian political processes can address this difficulty.
64 See supra Part II.A.
65 See Michelman, supra note 52, at 996 (discussing the Condorcet model).
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are still far more democratic than the process that defines international human rights. But, even with majority rule's flaws, it does not
follow that nondemocratic institutions are better than majority rule at
generating human rights protections, even for minorities.
Nondemocratic institutions lack incentives to protect politically weak
minorities. They may also embody prejudices that lead them to protect only some minorities while actually being antagonistic towards
others. Moreover, the choice of which minorities to protect and to
what degree is hardly a simple one that groups insulated from public
opinion are likely to get right. In sum, there is little reason to believe
that human rights law is a systematic exception to the general assumption that democratic lawmaking processes are superior to authoritarianism and oligarchy.
C. Advantages of SupermajoritarianDemocratic Processesfor Determining
Human Rights Law
We also recognize that human rights law is often needed to constrain the majority either from making rash decisions in times of crisis
or from violating the rights of minorities. But achieving these goals
does not depend on abandoning democratic forms of government. It
only requires that we modify the majority rules of ordinary democratic
politics. Mechanisms that are broadly democratic but eschew pure
majoritarianism can sometimes better generate protections for
minority rights than can majority rule.
One strategy to restrain majorities, for instance, is to create a
democratic form of higher politics-constitution-making. Constitutions such as those of the United States and other countries are often
made by supermajority rules. 66 These rules require a broad consensus
that can then be used to constrain the influence of majorities in ordinary governance. 67 Thus, for example, the United States and other
democracies protect freedom of speech, which constrains majorities
from abandoning that right in times of passion created by crisis or
war. 68 Judges then enforce this democratically made consensus
against majorities. Majorities are restrained, but through fundamentally democratic means.
66

For a detailed analysis of the supermajoritarian character of the U.S. Constitu-

tion, see John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our SupermajoritarianConstitution, 80 TEX. L. REv. 703 (2002).
67 SeeJON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND 129-41, 157-61 (2000) (discussing the use
of constitutions to prevent majorities from acting in the heat of passion).
68 See Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial Power in the State (and Federal) Courts, 2000
SuP. CT. REv. 357, 366 (viewing the First Amendment as partly a "precommitment
device").
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Supermajoritarian constitutionalism can also help protect minority rights. It addresses one of the main reasons that majority rule can
be less than optimal-the different intensities of voter preferences.
For instance, a majority may find some religious practices distasteful
and mildly prefer that they be banned. But the minority that engages
in these practices may intensely prefer that they be permitted. Under
simple majority rule without constitutional restraints, there is a danger that the majority will simply ban those religious practices that they
dislike. Constitutional rules enacted by supermajority processes can
69
help restrain such excesses.

One response to this problem is to create a process for determining the contents of rights that operates behind a "veil of ignorance" so
that citizens will be unsure of their own future preferences, making it
unclear whether they and their descendants will be in the highly
intense minority or the mildly intense majority. 70 This ignorance will
thus cause them to take more account of the minority's preferences.
Here, too, the supermajority rule for passing and repealing a constitutional provision creates a form of democracy conducive to the protection of minority rights, because it creates such a veil of ignorance.
Because of these voting rules, citizens recognize that enactments are
likely to endure longer than ordinary legislation and thus are less cer71
tain about how they or their children will be affected by its long tail.
Thus, the veil of ignorance can promote countermajoritarian rights.
In real world constitution-making, of course, framers rarely
operate behind a complete veil of ignorance.
Nonetheless,
supermajoritarian constitution-making is closer to a veil of ignorance

than ordinary majoritaritarian legislation, because it is likely to last
longer by virtue of being more difficult to repeal. Even in the absence
of any veil of ignorance effects, the need to win supermajority support
is likely to force legislators to take greater account of minority preferences than they would under a pure majoritarian democracy. Accord69 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 531-32 (1993) (utilizing the U.S. Constitution to protect unpopular minority
religious practice against a ban favored by the majority).
70 See Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive
Influence in PoliticalInstitutions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 917, 921-23 (1990) (explaining that
less information can help overcome stalemates by avoiding politically contentious
issues and reducing self-interest in the decisionmaking process). The veil of ignorance concept was first developed by John Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 118-23 (rev. ed. 1999). For the classic work arguing that supermajoritarian
constitution making improves the content of a society's basic legal rules, see JAMES M.
BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 302-06 (1962).
71 See Dennis C. Mueller, Federalist Governments and Trumps, 83 VA. L. REv. 1419,
1423 (1997).
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ingly, the majority becomes more considerate of the minority's
preferences. Thus, the U.S. Constitution, among others, protects the
religious freedom of minorities to a greater extent than ordinary political processes would.
Some have objected that supermajoritarian processes-and the
United States' amendment process in particular-are too stringent to
create new rights. 72 We disagree. Consider the Nineteenth Amendment, which granted women the right to vote. 73 This was a new political right, and it was granted through the amendment process despite
the fact that its beneficiaries were-in many cases-not even represented in the franchise electing the legislature that voted by a twothirds majority to propose the Amendment. 74 Accordingly, this kind
of formal supermajoritarian constitution-making has the demonstrated capacity to protect human rights, but does so through a democratic process. Voters participate democratically in the selection of
constitutional rules, but under voting rules that depart from pure

majoritarianism.
We recognize, however, that not everyone believes that such formal constitution-making is sufficient to protect all necessary individual
rights, particularly as the world changes. Another possible structure is
a system where judges have some discretion to elaborate on constitutional text to protect individual rights. But even that system needs
some substantial democratic input if jurists are to represent the values
of the people they govern. In the United States, for instance, an
elected President nominates the Justices and an elected Senate must
confirm them. 75 The confirmation process subjects every part of the
potential Justices' careers and records to substantial scrutiny. 76 Even
after confirmation, the press relentlessly covers and critiques Supreme
Court decisions, and the political branches of government can affect
their implementation. 77 Thus, this model of human rights elaboraSee, e.g., JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS IN AMERICAN
137-48 (1992).
73 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
74 For an argument that the judicial anticipation of rights through a living-constitution philosophy of interpretation of the Constitution rather than through originalism has undermined the amendment process in modem times, see John 0. McGinnis
& Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Precedent and Originalism, 103 Nw. U. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2009).
75 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
72

POLITICAL THOUGHT

76 See William G. Ross, Participationby the Public in the FederalJudicialSelection Process, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1, 6-24 (1990) (discussing increased public scrutiny of federal
court nominees).
77 For the most important work outlining the limits on judicial power imposed by
the political branches in the United States, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW
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tion has a substantial democratic element, even if it allows greater discretion for judicial elites than the more formal model under which
judges enforcing the Constitution have little or no discretionary
power.
In contrast, the elites that contribute so much to the development of human rights law face no such democratic discipline. 78 For
example, modem publicists are generally appointed by fellow faculty
members, not democratically accountable officials. Members of international organizations are often appointed by authoritarian governments. Even those appointed by democratic governments are not
chosen through processes with anything like the publicity or transparency accompanying Supreme Court nominations.
Thus, it is crucial to understand that our argument here is a comparative one. We do not claim that domestic processes that qualify as
democratic under our broad definition of democracy are perfect at
generating human rights, just that their processes are better than the
international human rights processes we describe below.
D.

What If Domestic ConstitutionalLaw Is Also Produced by
Undemocratic Processes?

An important objection to our argument for the advantages of
supermajoritarian constitutional law is that domestic constitutional
law may have been produced by undemocratic processes. If so, its
democratic credentials may be no better (or even worse) than those of
international law. This objection may seem to have particular force
with respect to the U.S. Constitution, which is much older than that of
any other democratic state. 79 As a result of its age, most of its important provisions were enacted in the eighteenth century, at a time when
women, slaves, many free black males, and even some non-propertyowning white men were denied the right to vote on its ratification.
Even the post-Civil War Amendments of the 1860s were still enacted
at a time when women and many blacks were denied the franchise.
There is no denying that this objection partly undercuts the democratic credentials of the U.S. Constitution. But from today's perspec72-106 (1991) (arguing that the
Supreme Court is tightly constrained in its ability to influence policy outcomes even
in such areas as civil rights law). However, Rosenberg and other scholars emphasizing
the limits of judicial power in the United States may to some extent have overstated
their case. See David E. Bernstein & Ilya Somin, JudicialPower and Civil Rights Reconsidered, 114 YALE L.J. 591, 595-98 (2004) (book review).
78 See discussion infra Part III.
79 See Louis Henkin, Revolutions and Constitutions, 49 LA. L. REV. 1023, 1035
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?

(1989).
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tive the greatest defects in the Constitution flowing from this
exclusion have been corrected. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery, 8 0 the Fourteenth Amendment constrains government racial
discrimination,8 1 and the Fifteenth Amendment forbids denial of the
franchise on account of race. 82 The Nineteenth Amendment grants
women the right to vote. 83 The Constitution now grants all citizens

the freedoms enjoyed by white, male property owners in 1789 and,
thus, today our constitutional system, as well as that of other industrial
nations, is substantially democratic. Moreover, these changes in the
Constitution occurred long before international law banned slavery
and racial discrimination,8 4 or required that women be given the
franchise.
In fact, it is a measure of the democracy deficit of international
human rights law that the ratification process that produced the Constitution in the 1780s was still far more democratic than that which
produces international human rights law today. At the time of the
American Revolution, anywhere from forty to ninety percent of Amer85
ican white males had the right to vote in their respective colonies.
Property qualifications and other restrictions on the franchise were
eased or abolished in many states between the mid-1770's and the ratification of the Constitution in 1787 to 1789.86 Several states allowed
87
free blacks, Native Americans, and even noncitizen aliens to vote.

Moreover, many states waived property qualifications and other
restrictions on the franchise for the ratification vote. 88 It is difficult to
precisely estimate what percentage of the adult American population
was eligible to vote in the 1787 and 1788 elections for members of the
state constitutional ratification conventions. However, it is likely that
the vast majority of white males were eligible, as were a significant
number of free blacks, which is a combined total of perhaps thirty
percent of all adults.8 9 This is far short of modern democratic stan80 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
81 Id. amend. XIV.
82 Id. amend. XV.
83 Id. amend. XIX.
84 The first official ban on slavery in international law was the Convention to
Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 60 L.N.T.S. 253.
85 See ALEXANDER KEYssAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 7 (2000) (discussing conflicting
estimates).
86 See id. at 8-11; see also CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE 20-39 (1960)
(describing the electorate at the time of the Revolution in England and the colonies).
87 See KEYssAR, supra note 85, at 418 n.10.
88 See AKHIL REED AmAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION 7 (2005).
89 This figure is a rough estimate based on the 1790 census data showing that the
American population in 1790 in large cities was about eighty-one percent white. See
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dards. But it was still a much more representative process than that
which produces most modern international law, which tends to be
produced by a tiny, unrepresentative elite and influenced by representatives of authoritarian states that deny voting rights to virtually
their entire populations. 90 As we discuss below, many of the most
important treaties that serve as the basis for international human
rights law were negotiated during the immediate post-World War II
era, at a time when many of the most powerful states with veto power
over the results were severely oppressive totalitarian dictatorships that
make the 1780s United States seem like a democratic paradise by
comparison.
By the time of the ratification of the post-Civil War Amendments
in the late 1860s, restrictions on the franchise had been considerably
loosened in most states. 91 Thus, the relative democratic legitimacy of
these ratification processes was even stronger than those of the Founding ratification.
E.

The Insufficiency of Democratic Override

Some have suggested that the imposition of international human
rights law is not problematic, because democracies can always override
the international norm. 92 Note that this objection would not apply
even on its own terms insofar as international human rights norms
were used as constitutional or to interpret constitutional law. Constitutional law norms cannot generally be overridden by ordinary democratic procedures.
Even when the status of international human rights is not
entrenched through constitutional interpretation, making it law until
it is overridden by the democratic process gives it the same status as a
statute despite the large differences in quality between the two kinds
Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, Historical Census Totals on Population Statistics by Race,
1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for Large Cities and Other UrbanPlaces
in the United States 115 tbl.A-1 (U.S. Census Bureau, Working Paper No. 76, 2002),
available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twpsOO76.pdf.
If we assume that males made up half the white population (forty percent of the total)
and that seventy-five percent of white males (probably a low estimate based on the
data cited above) had the fight to vote in the ratification elections, we get a figure of
thirty percent of the adult population eligible to vote in the ratification elections. To
this should be added the relatively small numbers of free blacks who could vote.
90 See infra Part III.A.
91 KEmssAR, supra note 85, at 87-116.
92 See Anupam Chander, Globalization and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1193, 1207
(2005) (arguing for the use of international law, such as the principal customary
international law norm against official torture, as a default rule in a democracy).
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of enactments. Legislative norms themselves are only law until the
legislature decides to repeal them. Yet everyone understands that the
status of being enacted into law gives a norm staying power. This is so
for two well-known reasons. First, legislatures can address a only a
limited agenda at any one time and thus legislative inertia would be
on the side of the norm. Second, legislative processes also often have
inbuilt constraints that make is hard to enact or repeal laws, even if
the action would have substantial support. For instance, in the United
States' effectively tricameral system, it takes a substantial political consensus of the House, Senate, and President to pass a law, including a
93
law repealing an international human rights norm.
In sum, we believe it is wholly appropriate to criticize the democracy deficit of international human rights law by comparing and contrasting the manner in which international human rights norms are
formed with the manner in which domestic human rights norms are
created in democratic societies. Democracy can be combined with
limits on majority rule that are themselves imposed by democratic
processes, including ones that depart from pure majority rule. In the
next section, we show that the democracy deficit of international
human rights law is substantial.
III.

THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT OF INTERNATIONAL

HuMAN

RIGHTS LAW

We begin by analyzing the nature of the democracy deficit of

international human rights law in a democratic state. Of course, if
that nation has adopted a provision of international human rights law
through its domestic democratic processes, there is no democracy deficit. The more interesting question arises when a democratic nation
has not incorporated the provision through a process as democratic as
that by which it incorporates its domestic norms.
It might be thought that in the absence of such incorporation,
the argument for the democracy deficit is simple and compelling. It is
undemocratic to impose norms on a nation that has not democratically embraced them. Similarly, it is undemocratic to impose international law on a democratic state merely because that law has been
enacted by undemocratic processes operating in international institutions or authoritarian governments abroad.
But advocates of international human rights might plausibly
respond that the democracy deficit is attenuated and the authority of
these norms is secured if the norms have a strong democratic pedi93 See McGinnis & Somin, supra note 1, at 1226-27 (detailing the consensus
required to repeal law).
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gree from sources other than those of the particular nation in question. Thus, advocates have argued that norms found in customary
international law or multilateral agreements on human rights should
be treated as universal because of the widespread agreement among
94
nations that this kind of international law commands.
Basic multilateral human rights treaties and norms generated by
customary international law suffer from a democracy deficit because
they do not provide real evidence of consensus or even widespread
support for their provisions from the democratic nations of the world.
The basic multilateral human rights treaties were negotiated at a time
when totalitarian nations had veto power at the negotiating table. As
a result, no one can be certain that the same provisions would have
emerged from a process in which all the players were democracies.
Moreover, many of the democratic states that agreed to these treaties
did so only as a matter of international law and did not incorporate
them into domestic law. The lack of domestic effect makes their
assent cheap talk.
Customary international law suffers from the same defects insofar
as it relies on these multilateral agreements for inferences as to the
content of custom. Even apart from such reliance, customary international law has multiple democracy deficits. Its content is inferred by
unrepresentative groups, such as international courts and publicists.
And it is generated by a process that is not transparent to the general
public. This circumstance creates agency costs and undermines democratic legitimacy.
A third source of international human rights norms, generally
grouped under the term "soft law," is growing in importance, but suffers from a comparable democracy deficit. These kinds of norms stem
from the deliberations of international organizations and commissions. The difficulty is that such entities are also not democratic even
if they purport to be authoritative.
Thus, whether human rights norms are rooted in multilateral
treaties or customary international law, they do not have a strong
democratic pedigree. Of course, the lack of democratic provenance
does not mean that their provisions are necessarily harmful; nor does
it suggest that democratic states should not, if they choose, incorporate these norms into domestic law by their usual legislative processes.
But it does show that their soundness must be defended on the basis
94 See, e.g., Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1540 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (characterizing international torts as "universal, definable, and obligatory international
norms," because of the "universal consensus in the international community as to
their binding status").
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of some other argument than their appearance in multilateral treaties

or their status as custom. As a result, their mere existence as rules of
international law should not be the basis for direct judicial incorporation, use as a background principle of legal interpretation, or even as
a reason for legislative adoption. We address the peculiar democracy
deficits of multilateral international human rights agreements, customary international law, and soft law in turn. But first we discuss a
problem that afflicts them all: the influence of nondemocratic states.
A.

The Influence of Nondemocratic States

A particularly important and underappreciated element of
democracy deficit of international human rights law is the influence
of nondemocratic states over its content. Nondemocratic governments have little incentive to take account of the interests of either
their own people or those of foreign states in determining their
stances on international law. The influence of nondemocratic states is
most obvious in multilateral human rights treaties that, although in
many cases are not ratified by the United States, are often claimed as a
basis for customary international law. 9 5 Totalitarian nations such as
those of the Soviet bloc played a key role in negotiationg these treaties, and exercised effective veto power over their adoption.
The Soviet bloc influenced the content of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), arguably the most important international human rights treaty. Joseph Stalin's representatives successfully
advocated inclusion of social and economic rights in the document, 96
watered down protections for political liberties and freedom of
speech 9 7 and blocked the addition of any significant protection for
private property rights. 98

The Soviet bloc also exercised influence

95 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 14; the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 29; and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, all
date from the Cold War period.
96 See generally JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 157-238 (1999) (discussing the development of these rights within the
declaration).
97 See id. at 60-61, 69-72 (noting that Soviet influence was responsible for the
defeat of efforts to include provisions protecting the right to form opposition political
parties and for the inclusion of protections against "hate speech" in order to justify
government censorship of "fascist" speech).
98 SeeMARYANN GLENDON, AWORLD MADE NEW 182-83 (2001). The Declaration
does include a guarantee that "everyone has the right to own property alone as well as
in association with others." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 14,
art. 17. However, governments were allowed to set this right aside more or less at will
due to the presence of other provisions in the text intended to constrain its scope. See
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over the content of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), perhaps the second most notable international
human rights treaty.9 9 These treaties represent bargains among
national governments. The democratic governments had to engage
in give and take in international negotiation. As a result, we cannot
be confident that the same provisions would have emerged absent
communist influence. We are, of course, not suggesting that all the
provisions in these treaties are necessarily harmful, only that we cannot be confident of their merits by virtue of the process that generated them.
Nondemocratic states also influence the content of other types of
raw international law. To the extent that customary international law
is based on state practice, 10 0 it is important to recognize that even
today 104 of the world's 193 nations are rated either "Not Free" or
only "Partly Free" according to Freedom House's annual survey of
political freedom around the world. 0 1 Thus, the majority of those
states influencing the content of state practice are either dictatorships
or at least not fully democratic. Nondemocratic states are also heavily
represented in the U.N. Human Rights Council and other interna02
tional bodies that influence the development of human rights law.'
The same is true of more narrowly focused committees tasked with

supra note 96, at 155-56. Soviet pressure led to the elimination of the term
"private" from the phrase "right to own property," in order to indicate that Article 17
does not provide any special protection for private property relative to the government's ownership claims. See GLENDON, supra, at 183.
99 See Stephanie Farrior, Molding the Matrix: The Historical and Theoretical Foundations of InternationalLaw Concerning Hate Speech, 14 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 1, 21-23 (1966)
(discussing the influence of the Soviet Union on provisions regarding hate speech in
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
100 See McGinnis & Somin, supra note 1, at 1207-09 (discussing this source of
international law).
101 See Press Release, Freedom House, supra note 45.
102 Nondemocratic states also had significant representation in the U.N. Human
Rights Council's predecessor organization, the U.N. Human Rights Commission. See
JEAN-CLAUDE BUHRER, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS LOSES ALL CREDIBILITY 4-5, 7 (2003), available at http://www.rsf.org/IMG/
pdf/ReportONUgb.pdf (documenting how U.N. Commission on Human Rights
member states that are themselves human rights violators have blocked condemnation of nearly all those governments that violate human rights the most);
see also Human Rights Watch, UN: Rights Council Disappoints Again (Oct. 5, 2006),
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/10/06/global14354.htm
(noting that
nondemocratic "[s]tates with poor human rights records dominated the [U.N.
Human Rights] [C]ouncil's deliberations").
MORSINK,
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interpreting and applying more specific international human rights
treaties.

03

The influence of nondemocratic states is an important shortcoming of all raw international law. 104 But it is a particularly serious problem in the case of international human rights law. Nondemocratic
states are by far the most important violators of human rights. Statesponsored mass murder is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of
millions of innocent people in the twentieth century alone, 0 5 easily
overshadowing all other rights violations. The Soviet Union-the
nondemocratic government that exercised the most influence on the
content of modern international human rights law-was also arguably
the greatest of all twentieth century violators of human rights. 10 6 Current estimates of the death toll of government-sponsored mass murder in the USSR range from twenty million to as high as sixty-one
million. 10 7 And these figures do not even consider the Soviet governments' many other human rights violations, such as infringements on
freedom of speech and religion.
In short, nondemocratic states that influence the content of
international human rights law have a fundamental conflict of interest. They have every incentive to transform the content of rights
whose implementation might interfere with their own repressive policies or threaten their hold on power.
An even more serious impediment to automatically assuming that
international human rights law is beneficial is the ability of authoritarian nations to use their influence to promote rights that legitimize
their authority and justify their use of repression against potential
political opponents. Examples of the latter include the Soviet bloc's
successful efforts to include bans on hate speech in the UDHR and
ICCPR, rights whose inclusion they sought in part to justify the suppression of opposition political speech under communist governments. I0 8 Communist states also sponsored a longstanding and
partially successful effort to use international law to justify and legiti103
104
105

See infra Part III.D.1.
See McGinnis & Somin, supra note 1, at 1204.
See generally R.J. RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT 1-28 (1994) (compiling the

data).
106 Only Communist China's death toll even begins to approach that of the USSR.
See id. at 5 fig.1.1.

107 For the former,

see ST-EPHANE COURTOIS ET AL., THE BLACK BOOK OF COMMU-

4 (Mark Kramer ed. & trans., Jonathan Murphy trans., Harvard Univ. Press
1999); for the latter, see R.J. RUMMEL, LETHAL POLITICS 24 (1990).
108 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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mate military interventions intended to repress domestic opposition
to communist totalitarian regimes.' 0 9
Abortive 1980s efforts to institute a global regime of censorship
through the New World Information and Communication Order are
another case where nondemocratic regimes sought to use international law to advance their own interests."10 Today, nondemocratic
nations are spearheading efforts to establish a new international
human "right" requiring the suppression of speech that "defames"
religion."'1 If adopted, this law would justify censorship of speech critical of radical Islamism and of government-sponsored religions more
generally.
A process for generating human rights law in which
nondemocratic states play a substantive role is similar to a system for
guarding chicken coops in which some authority is allocated to
wolves. It empowers the very entities whose depredations it seeks to
prevent. We do not assert that the fact that a totalitarian or authoritarian state supported a particular human rights norm somehow proves
that the norm is wrong. A norm supported by even the worst of governments might turn out to be beneficial, and one they oppose might
turn out to be harmful. We do, however, suggest that a lawmaking
process that gives nondemocratic states substantial influence over the
content of human rights law will, as a general rule, produce norms
whose content is inferior to that produced by the domestic law of
democratic states. That prediction flows naturally from the interest of
authoritarian rulers in blocking the enactment of norms that might
curb their repressive practices, while promoting those that could facilitate them. At the very least, human rights law enacted by processes
over which nondemocratic governments have influence should not be
accorded a presumption of validity within the domestic law of wellfunctioning democracies.

109 See James P. Terry, Moscow's Corruption of the Law of Armed Conflict: Important
Lessons for the 21st Century, 53 NAVAL L. REV. 73, 73-75 (2006).
110 See Colleen Roach, The U.S. Position on the New World Information and Communication Order,J. COMM., Autumn 1987, at 36, 36.
111 See Posting of Ilya Somin to the Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/
archives/archive_2007_02_04-2007_02_ 10.shtml#1170874980 (Feb. 7, 2007, 15:01
EST); see also Liaquat Ali Khan, CombatingDefamation of Religions, AM. MUSLIM, Jan. 1,
2007, http://theamericanmuslim.org/tam.php/features/articles/combating-defamation_of religions (noting that the U.N. General Assembly Resolution supporting
this norm was passed over the opposition of nearly all the world's liberal democracies,
and pointing out that the resolution may constitute "soft international law").
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MultilateralHuman Rights Treaties

Besides the influence of nondemocratic states, there is another
more fundamental problem that contributes to the democracy deficit
of multilateral international human rights treaties: the assent of many
democratic nations to multilateral human rights treaties is cheap talk,
insofar as that assent does not commit them to making the provisions
of those treaties a part of their domestic law. Nations that have dualist
systems with respect to international law do not make such commitments. In dualist systems, international legal obligations are separate
from domestic legal obligations and do not displace contrary domestic
law without action by the government to incorporate international law
into domestic legislation.1 12 Thus, even democratic ratification by
dualist nations does not show that its citizens and legislators wish to
have international law enforced without additional intermediate
steps.' 13 Many, if not most, legal systems are dualist with respect to
international law. 1 14 For instance, the United Kingdom has a dualist
system, and Commonwealth nations, which compose a substantial proportion of the world's democracies, follow the lead of their former
sovereign.a15
By contrast, treaties signed by nations with monist legal systems
may be incorporated into domestic law once they have been concluded without further legislation. 1 6 But even some monist nations
have complex structures through which treaties ratified as a matter of
international law must pass before they will be given domestic
112 SeeJohn H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis,
86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310, 314-15 (1992).
113 The question of how far nations may actually go to comply with international
obligations simply because they are international obligations is a vast subject which we
cannot address here. Our view, like that of many other modern theorists, is that states
do not have a strong tendency to comply with international law for the sake of international law compliance, or even to maintain their reputation among other nation
states. SeeJack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The New International Law Scholarship, 34
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 463, 466-72 (2006). But we certainly acknowledge that the

influence of a nation's sense of obligation to comply is an empirical question.
Nations could conceivably at some time in the future develop a stronger sense of
obligation to international law, making their international commitments a signal of
commitment more akin to domestic legislation. Just as the case for making international law a force in our system might be strengthened if it were created by a global
democratic process, it could also be strengthened if it were a product of largely democratic states that had a noninstrumental sense of obligation to international law.
114 See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 63 (7th rev. ed. 1997).
115 See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 187-99 (2d ed. 2007).
116

See id. at 146.
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effect. 1 7 Others, while nominally giving treaties domestic effect, do
not readily permit their courts to enforce those that seem vague or
aspirational. 118 As a result, the number of nations whose judiciaries
actually enforce multilateral human rights treaties as rules of decision
that set aside their own law seem relatively few in number. 1 19
The United States does not enforce treaties unless they are
deemed self-executing, as the recent case of Medellin v. Texas demonstrates. 120 The political branches must intend that a treaty be given
direct effect in our domestic jurisprudence. Otherwise it will be
12 1
deemed non-self-executing and fail to create binding federal law.
The U.S. Senate has declared all the provisions in our human rights
122
treaties to be non-self-executing.
Beyond these important doctrinal points lie functional reasons
for refusing to give these treaties direct domestic effect. Nations have
many reasons for declining to implement the international rules of
treaties without first subjecting them to domestic legislative processes.
They may regard international law, particularly when human rights
are involved, as aspirational. 123 Or they may believe that the international rules are too vague or open-ended to be given automatic
effect. 124 Whatever their reasons, when nations do not agree to have
international law trump their own law, international law is, in economic terms, cheap talk, and is a less plausible source of norms to
displace those norms to which a democratic nation actually agrees to
125
be bound.
117 See, e.g., id. at 147-48 (discussing the treaty process in Germany and the
Netherlands).
118 Id. at 146-47 (discussing the treaty process in France).
119 To confirm this result, we consulted a database of international law cases that
may be found at Oxford Univ. Press, Reports on International Law, http://ildc.
(last visited
oxfordlawreports.com/uid=108317/subscriber/?&authstatuscode=202
Apr. 2, 2009).
120 See 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008).
121 Id.
122 See Thomas Buergenthal, The Evolving InternationalHuman Rights System, 100
AM.J. INT'L L. 783, 806 n.114 (2006).
123 See DonaldJ. Kochan, No Longer Little Known But Now a DoorAjar: An Overview of
the Evolving and DangerousRole of the Alien Tort Statute in Human Rights and International
Law Jurisprudence,8 CHAP. L. REV. 103, 131 (2005) (noting that customary international law is often aspirational and not legally enforceable).
124 See Matthew D. Thurlow, Note, ProtectingCulturalProperty in Iraq: How American
Military Policy Comports with InternationalLaw, 8 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 153, 183
(2005) (presenting the possibility that nations prefer vague language in order to cre-

ate conflicting standards).
125 Id.
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Thus, norms created by multilateral agreements are unlikely to
be as beneficial as those created by democratic domestic political
processes. The democracy deficit of multilateral agreements may be
most self-evident when authoritarian and totalitarian nations participate in their formation. But on closer inspection, the even more
important point is the attenuated nature of most nations' agreement
to these norms. The refusal to give treaties domestic force detracts
from the clarity, force, and perhaps the sincerity of the commitment
126
to the norms embodied in them.
It is bootstrapping to argue that a nation which has not incorporated an international human rights principle into its domestic law
should incorporate it by virtue of the democratic authority conferred
by its presence in multilateral treaties. These treaties do not represent
the general assent of other democratic nations for domestic
incorporation.
Even if such assent could be inferred, it would not necessarily
justify incorporation of international law into the domestic law of
democracies that had not ratified the treaty in a way that overrides
contrary domestic legal rules. As we have argued elsewhere, divergent
legal rules among different democracies are often justified by the
need to account for differing local conditions and by the desirability
of preserving diversity among legal systems so that migrants can vote
1 27
with their feet for the system of government they prefer.
C.

Customary InternationalLaw

Customary international law has several important shortcomings
from the standpoint of democratic accountability. The first is that
nations do not have to assent to a principle of customary international
law in order for one to be created. Instead, nations are considered to
have consented to a principle simply if they failed to object or continue to object persistently.1 28 Obviously, this measure of assent com126 See, e.g., Arthur M. Weisburd, The Effect of Treaties and Other Formal International
Acts on the Customary Law of Human Rights, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 99, 134-35
(1996) (arguing that human rights treaties generally lack true enforcement mechanisms, raising doubts that states intend for them to have a legal character).
127 McGinnis & Somin, supra note 1, at 1217-19.
128 The persistent objectors rule provides that states which have persistently
objected during the emergence of a custom are not bound by it as a rule of international law. See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditionaland Modern Approaches to Customary InternationalLaw: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 765 n.90 (2001). It has
been widely accepted that the persistent objector rule is not applicable to jus cogens
norms and thus has limited scope. In the absence of a persistent objector doctrine,
the process for forming international norms is even more problematic, because they
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pares unfavorably to domestic democracy. Domestic political actors
cannot create norms by failing to object but must affirmatively
embrace a practice to make it law, assuring deliberation and
accountability.
A second defect is that such treaties and other international declarations are little more than cheap talk if nations do not actually
enforce them. 1 29 Many nations flout such international norms and
most others, as discussed above, do not give them domestic effect
enforceable by their courts. 130 In contrast, when the U.S. Constitution includes rights or Congress passes legislation protecting those
rights, there is an enforcement system that provides evidence that
such norms are actually embraced sincerely.
At least provisions in negotiated agreements have the virtue of
being written down, which in theory enables citizens to access and
assess them. The latter may ensure a small modicum of democratic
accountability. By contrast, customary principles of international
human rights, unlike domestic statutes, do not rest on any canonical
text. Someone must assess how widespread a practice is and whether
13 1
it reflects a legal norm.
An important group responsible for determining the answers to
these questions are publicists who in modern parlance are largely
international law professors.' 3 2 Unlike Supreme Court Justices, law
professors are not selected by elected officials or subject to public
scrutiny. As a result, there is no mechanism for assuring that their
views are in any way representative. For instance, a recent study has
shown that elite international law professors in the United States are
highly unrepresentative of the general population, leaning Demomay not reflect even the attenuated consent by the democratic state that is implicit in
the persistent objector rule.
129 As economic analysis shows, cheap talk is the opposite of costly signaling. See
Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectiveson the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation,151 U. PA. L. REv.
1417, 1445-47 (2003). There is much less reason to believe that ratifying a treaty
represents the real preferences of the domestic polity if the members of the polity are
not willing to have the rules enforced against themselves.
130 See, e.g., Weisburd, supra note 126, at 134-36.
131 See generally Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT'L L.
146, 147 (1987) (describing the process of assessing international customary law).
132 See Sean D. Magenis, Natural Law as the Customary International Law of SelfDefense, 20 B.U. INT'L L.J. 413, 424 n.57 (2002) ("The role of publicists is especially
important in shaping international law because of the dearth of 'black letter law' on
the subject."); see alsoJohn 0. McGinnis, Contemporary Foreign and InternationalLaw in
ConstitutionalConstruction, 69 ALB. L. REv. 801, 806 (2006) (discussing the role of law
professors and other publicists).
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cratic rather than Republican by a ratio of approximately five-toone.133 If such an ideologically homogeneous group is doing the
choosing, we are likely to get unrepresentative norms. This point
again has even more resonance in human rights than in other areas of
law. Given the "culture wars" over the content of such rights, 34 it is
even more likely that ideological imbalance in ranks of publicists will
lead to idiosyncrasy in human rights norms than in less contentious
issues, such as the criteria for state recognition.
Fourth, as we have shown before, survey research shows, perhaps
not surprisingly, that average Americans understand less well what
135
goes on in Geneva and other foreign parts than Washington does.
This point is probably not confined to Americans. Individuals in
other states are likely to know more about what happens in the governmental bodies of their own capital than those of international lawmaking institutions. This relative ignorance exacerbates the agency
costs arising from the power of publicists, also contributing to the
democracy deficit.
Accordingly, there are multiple democracy deficits in customary
international law. 13 6 Some of them seem substantially worse in the
human rights context than in other fields. Thus, in the area of
human rights, we should be particularly wary of importing customary
international law into the domestic law of democratic nations.
D.

Other Sources of InternationalHuman Rights Norms

1. Committees Charged with Interpreting Multilateral Human
Rights Law
Besides norms that are deemed a formal part of customary international law, there are other important sources of human rights
norms. Most salient are international bodies with formal duties in
providing glosses and articulations of central human rights treaties,
including: the ICCPR; the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul133 SeeJohn 0. McGinnis et al., The Patterns and Implications of PoliticalContributions
by Elite Law School Faculty, 93 GEO. L.J. 1167, 1182-83 (2005) (discussing political campaign-contribution patterns of international law professors).
134 For a brief discussion of these culture wars and the debate over human rights,
see generally Rhoda E. Howard, Human Rights and the Culture Wars: Globalization and
the Universality of Human Rights, 53 INT'LJ. 94 (1998) (discussing the new challenges
posed by globalization to the theory that human rights are universal in principle).
135 We have discussed citizens' comparative ignorance of international law at
length elsewhere. See McGinnis & Somin, supra note 1, at 1210-17.
136 Here we are discussing the democratic deficit of modern views of customary
international law. For a discussion of the democratic deficit of more classical views of
custom, see id. at 1207-10.
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tural Rights; the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women; the Rights of the Child Convention; and the Geneva
Convention. These are generally softer law than norms expressly and
specifically provided in the multilateral treaty or custom. 1 37 Nevertheless, as Professor Waters suggests, domestic courts are now relying on
soft law as an interpretive tool. 138 As a result, these norms have poten-

tial domestic affect as well. Accordingly, we offer our evaluation of the
democracy deficit of the international organizations that generate
these norms.
We begin by considering the committees that elaborate on various multilateral human rights treaties. All major multilateral international human rights covenants have committees responsible for
monitoring compliance with their terms and issuing reports elaborating on them. We consider committees from the four covenants mentioned above because they seem to us among the most important and
representative of the human rights treaties.
While state parties to these treaties can elect anyone nominated
by a government party to the treaties, it is quite clear from their membership that that there is an attempt, as with most international bodies, to elect a group that is representative geographically with due
consideration given to electing a substantial number from powerful
states. 139 Moreover, all these four committees in fact have substantial
numbers of members nominated by nations that cannot be considered firmly democratic14 0-certainly not nearly as democratic as the
United States or the states of Western Europe. 141 Even fully demo137 Cf Craig Segall, Book Note, 24 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 341, 342-43 (distinguishing
"hard treaty law" from the "softer 'law' of declarations, norms, and behavioral
standards").
138 Waters, supra note 33, at 666-67 (showing how courts are using treaties as
bridges to incorporate soft law).
139 See Dana D. Fischer, Reporting Under the Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights: The
FirstFive Years of the Human Rights Committee, 76 AM.J. INT'L L. 142, 143 (1982).
140 The dangers of allowing nondemocratic nations to influence the content of
human rights law are explored more fully supra Part III.A.
141 The Human Rights Committee has members from two authoritarian nationsEgypt and Tunisia-and from one nation whose democratic credentials are shakyMorocco. See Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Human Rights
Committee-Members, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/members.htm
(last visited Apr. 2, 2009). The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

has four members from authoritarian regimes-China, Belarus, Jordan, and Egyptand four from states whose democratic credentials are suspect-Algeria, Cameroon,
Morocco, and Russia. See Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Com-

mittee on Social, Economic, and Cultural rights-Members, http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/bodies/cescr/members.htm (Apr. 2, 2009). The Committee on the Rights of
the Child has members from the authoritarian nations of Egypt, Qatar, Tunisia, and
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cratic nations, such as the United States, nominate members in a process that is far less transparent and publicized than, for instance, the
Supreme Court nomination process. As a result, a narrow class of
insiders, mostly former diplomats and law professors, tend to be the
appointees. 14 2 This lack of diversity also contributes to a lack of representativeness and democratic legitimacy on such committees.
2.

The International Committee of the Red Cross

The ICRC has assumed, for human rights advocates, the role of
preferred interpreter of the Geneva Conventions. 143 We say
"assumed" because unlike the committees discussed above, which are
given such official roles by their respective multilateral treaties, the
Geneva Conventions do not provide a formal interpretative role to the
ICRC. To be sure, the ICRC is given a monitoring role, and has often
taken the place of affected state parties in the role of checking on the
conditions of prisoners of war.1 44 For instance, the Red Cross
checked on the conditions of both Allied and Axis prisoners during
the World War II. Nevertheless, this monitoring function does not
45
entail a formal, let alone a privileged, interpretive role.'
Uganda, and two members from nations whose democratic credentials are questionable at best-Algeria and Bangladesh. See Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human
Rights, Committee on the Rights of the Child-Members, http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/bodies/crc/members.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2009). The Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women includes three members from authoritarian or totalitarian regimes-China, Cuba, and Egypt-and two from regimes whose
democratic credentials are suspect-Algeria and Bangladesh. See Office of the U.N.
High Comm'r for Human Rights, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women-Members, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/membership.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
142 See Joanna Harrington, Punting Terrorists, Assassins and Other Undesirables:
Canada, the Human Rights Committee and Requests for Interim Measures of Protection, 48
McGILL L.J. 55, 63 & n.48 (2003); see also McGinnis & Somin, supra note 1, at 1203-04
(discussing the U.S. nomination process for the International Court of Justice).
143 We recognize that there is a debate about whether humanitarian law should be
categorized as part of human rights law. See DAVID P. FoiSrSE, THE HuMANITAR ANS
250-59 (2005). By discussing humanitarian law in this Article, we do not mean to
take sides in that debate. We include humanitarian law in our analysis because, however it is categorized, the role of the Red Cross as a putatively authoritative interpreter
raises democracy deficit questions not unlike those of other committees charged with
implementing international human rights law.
144 See Eric A. Posner, InternationalLaw and the DisaggregatedState, 32 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 797, 816 (2005).
145 SeeJeremy Rabkin, After Guantanamo: The War over the Geneva Convention, NAT'L
INTEREST, Summer 2002, at 15, 22-23 (detailing ICRC's attempt to expand its role
under the Geneva conventions).
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Even in the context of the international law world, the ICRC is a
peculiarly unrepresentative body. Unlike the committees that elaborate on the rights included in various covenants, none of the members
of this committee are nominated by any democratically accountable
government. While the name of the organization is the International
Committee of the Red Cross, the committee is in fact a self-perpetuating body composed entirely of Swiss citizens. 146 Switzerland is the
world's most famously neutral nation. This history gives its citizens a
very distinctive perspective on humanitarian law, as even a sympathetic accounting of its mission acknowledges. 1 47 The perspective of
those who are either part of or amenable to a particular organization,
even one as no doubt worthy as the ICRC, is likely to be narrower still.
They will tend to be interested in advancing the ideals and interests of
that organization rather than neutrally interpreting the law, as almost
all organizations tend to expand their jurisdictional reach. 148 One
would expect that they use materials to expand the ambit of humanitarian rule, and, as we will see, that expectation is fulfilled. 4 9
The parochial and homogenous nature of the ICRC helps
explain why it may fail to give adequate consideration to opposing
views.' 50 Small homogenous groups often become increasingly
extreme in their views over time, for reasons Cass Sunstein has
explained. 15 The structural flaws of the ICRC are an interesting
example of the broader phenomenon of the influence of small,
unrepresentative elite groups on international law. 152
In fact, it is a powerful confirmation of the unreflective nature of
much commentary on human rights law in general, and humanitarian
law in particular, that the parochial and undemocratic elements of the
ICRC are never discussed. Instead, even such eminent scholars as
Dean Harold Hongju Koh call for "governments and nongovernmental organizations" to rely on the opinions of the ICRC because of its
alleged lack of parochialism. 5 3 However, because of its structure as a
146 See FORSyrHE, supra note 143, at 202.
147 Id. at 237-41.
148 See Stephen Zamora, Regulating the Global Banking Network-What Role (If Any)
for the IMF?, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1953, 1954 (1994) (noting "the propensity of international organizations to expand their jurisdiction").
149 See infra notes 169-84 and accompanying text.
150 See infra Part IV.D.
151 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110
YALE LJ. 71, 85-97 (2000) (explaining group polarization in detail).
152 This point is discussed in greater depth in McGinnis & Somin, supra note 1, at
1202-07.
153 See Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479,
1512 (2003).
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single private organization chosen from citizens of a single small
nation, the ICRC is as parochial as individual nation states themselves-arguably much more so.
The parochial nature of the ICRC raises questions about the deference it should be given in fabricating and construing humanitarian
law. To be sure, humanitarian law, like the law of military conflict
among nations, is different from much of human rights law in that the
actions of one nation have substantial spillovers into another. For this
reason, it may be optimal in principle to have international rules on
this subject when it is not optimal to have international rules on many
human rights subjects that we have discussed above.
But the world does not have a recognized international
rulemaker in humanitarian law, and certainly not one with any democratic legitimacy. As a result, one needs to make a pragmatic argument that the structure of the ICRC is likely to lead it to make better
interpretations of humanitarian law than a nation state before suggesting that the nation state defer to the organization's interpretations. Is the ICRC or the United States more likely to reach better
interpretations? As described above, the ICRC is a nondemocratic
and insular institution, which raises doubts about the quality of its
determinations. But it might be argued that any individual nation,
even a democratic one, will be imperfect in reaching humanitarian
law determinations as well. It, too, has parochial interests. Nevertheless, there is a plausible argument that United States is likely to reach
better determinations about the appropriate legal norms, particularly
about the public goods involved in preserving global security.
Norms produced by a small and undemocratic elite are unlikely
to focus on producing global public goods. 15 4 Since the benefits of
the new public good will usually flow overwhelmingly to the general
population rather than to the elites, it seems unlikely that the latter
will devote themselves to developing norms that increase public-goods
production. This is especially true if the necessary time, resources,
and political capital can instead be devoted to the production of
norms that provide greater benefits to the elites themselves, such as
the positive publicity and reputation for humaneness that generally
accrue to an organization that expands the reach of a body of humanitarian law.
In contrast to such bureaucracies, the United States has strong
incentives to contribute to the provision of global public goods,
including sound norms of humanitarian law. Since the United States
154

This point is discussed in greater detail in McGinnis & Somin, supranote 1, at

1238-39.

1778

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 84:4

is by far the world's largest economy, producing some twenty percent
of world GDP, 155 it will often have incentives to provide public goods
that further economic growth and prosperity, even if many other
nations choose to free ride. Global security is one such public good.
Humanitarian law is intimately connected with this global public
good because it attempts to assure reasonable protection of military
and civilians during wars. Of course, it necessarily involves a tradeoff
between the protection of rights and the preservation of a military's
ability to fight necessary wars. The United States, because of its position in the international system, would be in a good position to make
such tradeoffs, due to its active military presence around the world
and its interest in maintaining the security of the world economy.
Given that its soldiers are involved in many conflicts around the world,
the United States is acutely concerned with the welfare of military personnel. Moreover, given that it is a nation of immigrants, its citizens
are likely to have at least some concern for the well-being of civilians
worldwide as well. Of course, we are not suggesting that the United
States will make all the right calls; particular administrations and politicians may commit grave errors. Nevertheless it is far from clear that
in the long run its democratic processes are not more likely to fashion
more sensible norms than is the ICRC.
IV.

THE EFFECT OF THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT ON INTERNATIONAL

HUMAN

RIGHTS LAw

The democracy deficit of international human rights law casts
doubt on the supposed beneficence of international human rights
norms relative to those established by domestic democratic institutions. Our purpose is not to show that any particular international
human rights norms are wrong. But we will endeavor to briefly
demonstrate that international human rights norms are highly contestable, and indeed potentially conflict with other norms of human
rights that people can reasonably hold. That openness to contestation
underscores one of the main points of this Article: that at least as to
broadly democratic nations, international human rights norms may
displace norms that are better for the nation concerned. Moreover,
following human rights norms has the potential defect of imposing a
uniform rule that discourages a diversity of approaches. It is the diversity of approaches that will lead to experimentation and competition,
155 Figure computed from the Central Intelligence Agency, World Fact Book,
Rank Order-GDP (Purchasing Power Parity), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2009). The
U.S. GDP is $14.58 trillion, 20.6% of the world total of over $70 trillion. Id.
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and these processes in time are more likely to lead to an optimal set of
rights.
This danger is becoming more acute as the scope of international
human rights expands. Here, we very briefly look at three rights
within human rights law and a set of rights and duties within humanitarian law which have a degree of international recognition and show
that there is no consensus about their effects. This lack of consensus
underscores our two major points. First, it would be a mistake to
enforce international human rights against democratic nations
because there is no reason to believe that these rights will be better
than the decisions reached by that nation's domestic political process.
Second, the lack of consensus shows that there are considerable benefits from the diversity and competition that come from allowing a
diversity of legal rules in different nations rather than a uniform
approach dictated by internationalizing a set of rights.
A.

Hate Speech

Some international law advocates believe that "hate speech" violates customary international law. The ICCPR in fact forbids "[a]ny
advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence." 156 Louise Arbour, the
former U.N. Commissioner for Human Rights, opened an investigation of whether Denmark's willingness to permit cartoons of the
1 57
prophet Mohammed violated international law against hate speech.
She also argued that international law bans "xenophobic arguments
1 58
in political discourse."
The desirability of laws against hate speech is a deeply contestable
issue. The United States, for instance, not only does not have laws
against hate speech, but its Constitution forbids such laws. 159 While
an international law requirement for hate speech rules may have roots
in a conception of human dignity, a prohibition of such laws also can
be a rooted in a strong view of individual freedom. Although the
requirement can be defended on the grounds that it protects minorities, so too can a prohibition on hate speech laws. In practice, hate
speech laws can be used to silence politically unpopular minority
156 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 29, art. 20(2).
157 See Paul Belien, UN to Investigate Racism of Danish Cartoonists,BRUSSELS J., Dec.
7, 2005, http://www.brusseisjournal.com/node/546.
158 Louise Arbour, U.N. Comm'r for Human Rights, Remarks at International Day
for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Panel Discussion (Mar. 21, 2005).
159 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992).
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groups at least as easily as the more powerful majority.1 60 It is not our
purpose to resolve this debate here, just to use it to show that following an international norm in this matter would prematurely end
debate and experimentation about a difficult political issue.
B.

Comparable Worth

The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women has interpreted its organic treaty convention as requiring
comparable worth. The language the Committee uses is "equal remuneration for work of equal value."1 6 1 It is quite clear that the Committee does not contemplate that the market should be responsible for
determining the value of work. The Committee suggests that nations
"consider... job evaluation systems based on gender-neutral criteria
that would facilitate the comparison of the value of those jobs of a
different nature, in which women presently predominate, with those
in which men presently predominate." 162
Comparable worth is another contestable idea about which there
is no consensus. One strong argument against it is the lack of objective criteria to evaluate the worth of a job. Another is that it would
require a bureaucracy to make such determinations and this bureaucracy, like others, would be subject to rent seeking and make poor
decisions, even if there were some objective way to measure such
value. 163 Furthermore, creating a government agency that, in effect,
sets pay levels for all jobs would, at a stroke, eliminate most of the
advantages of a market economy and saddle the state with a system of
central planning under which the state would have to allocate labor,
since the market could no longer use the price system to do S0.164
Finally, comparable worth interferes with the liberty of individual
employees to freely strike a bargain with their employers for their ser160 Cf DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, YOU CAN'T SAY THAT! 4-8 (2003) (describing opposition to restrictive speech laws because they had been used to stifle the civil rights
movement and are likely to be used against unpopular minority groups more
generally).
161 U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General
Recommendation No. 13: Equal Remunerationfor Work of Equal Value, U.N. Doc. A/44/38
(8th Sess. 1989), reprinted in U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Compilation of
General Comments and GeneralRecommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at
240, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (May 12, 2004).
162 Id.
163 See George Rutherglen, The Theoy of Comparable Worth as a Remedy for Gender
Discrimination, 82 GEO. L.J. 135, 136 (1993).
164 Id.
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vices.1 65 This latter point underscores that the conflicting conceptions of rights are at issue in comparable worth. Its supporters
emphasize women's group-claim rights, while its opponents emphasize the rights of all individuals to be free from government coercion
66
in their contractual relationships.1
C.

The Right to Housing

A variety of international human rights documents hold that
there is a right to adequate housing. This is a right that states are
obligated to enforce, and thus, it is a claim right to resources rather
than a negative liberty. Of course, that kind of right can conflict with
individual liberties.
In 1991, the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights elaborated on this right in a way that underscores this conflict.
It included suggestions that everyone, including renters, "should possess a degree of security of tenure which guarantees legal protection
against forced eviction" and "forced evictions are prima facie" inconsistent with the Covenant. 16 7 It is difficult to pin down the meanings
of these claims. But one plausible reading suggests that, as a general
matter, landlords should not have the right to evict tenants, even
though eviction is the ultimate means to assure that rents are paid and

that rental contracts are voluntary.
This conception would severely undermine individual rights to
contract for housing. It not only threatens property rights of landowners, but it also makes it less likely that the poor and those with low
credit ratings can obtain housing, because landlords will be less likely
to lend to such individuals unless they know they can forcibly evict
them in the case of nonpayment of rent. 168
Once again, we are not seeking to prove that a system of strong
private property rights, including the right to call on the state to evict
individuals for nonpayment of rent, is superior to one in which those
rights are curtailed in the interest of enforcing a right to housing. We
165 For a good summary of the case against comparable worth, including the
above and other arguments, see generally ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, EQUITY AND GENDER
39-61 (1989).
166 CompareRuthergien, supra note 163, at 135 (explaining that supporters tend to
connect "pay equity" with the broader right of "gender equity"), with PAUL, supranote
165, at 109-11 (noting objections to the inefficiencies of comparative worth's "interference with the market").
167 Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Report on the Sixteenth and Seventeenth
Sessions, annex IV, No. 7, U.N. Doc. E/1998/22 (June 20, 1998).
168 For a brief discussion of the economic logic behind this conclusion, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 514-18 (5th ed. 1998).
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do, however, believe that it is clear that a housing system that depends
on private enterprise, including contractual freedom between renters
and owners, has virtues and should not be limited by international
fiat.
D.

HumanitarianLaw

Here we consider the positions of the ICRC on humanitarian law.
We compare its conclusions on controversial issues of humanitarian
law with those of the United States. As in our previous discussions,
our purpose here is not to show that the ICRC's judgments are clearly
wrong, but that they are eminently contestable. Given the different
incentives of the United States and the ICRC described above, there is
no reason to prefer a priori the results reached by the ICRC to those
of the United States.
The recent conflicts with al Qaeda have occasioned dramatic
examples of the differences between the United States and the ICRC
on humanitarian law. For instance, the ICRC has taken the position
that members of terrorist organizations like al Qaeda that are captured in noninternational conflicts (that is, where no other state is a
party) cannot be held as enemy combatants at all, regardless of
whether they are given POW status. 169 Instead, they must be either
tried as civilians or released. A panel of the Fourth Circuit relied
expressly on the conclusions of the ICRC in determining that the
United States could not hold Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, a member of
170
al Qaeda captured in the United States, as an enemy combatant.
This judicial opinion demonstrates the authoritative weight that is
accorded the opinions of this particular NGO.
The United States as well as some international law scholars disagreed with the ICRC. 17 1 The argument that terrorists captured in
noninternational conflicts cannot be enemy combatants relies heavily

169 This position is in keeping with the basic tenet of the ICRC that there are no
"black holes" in the Geneva Convention and that all combatants must be treated
either as prisoners of war or civilians. See PeterJan Honigsberg, Chasing "Enemy Combatants" and Circumventing InternationalLaw: A License for Sanctioned Abuse, 12 UCLAJ.
INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 9 (2007).
170 AI-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 185 (4th Cir. 2007), revd en banc sub nom., A]Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated as moot sub nom., A1-Marri v.
Spagone, No. 08-368, 2009 WL 564940 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2009).
171 See, e.g.,
Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, CongressionalAuthorization and
the War on Terrorism, 118 HARv. L. REV. 2047, 2115-16 (2005).
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on the notion that Protocol I of the Geneva Convention 172 has
become customary international law. But the United States refused to
sign Protocol I of the Geneva Convention precisely because it was concerned about its potential use as protection for terrorists.173 We have
already discussed our reservations about using custom in preference
174
to more democratic forms of norm creation.
Moreover, as a policy matter, it is hardly obvious that nations
should not be able to hold terrorists who are fighting as members of
military organizations under procedures different from those used for
other detainees. Civilian tribunals may not be designed to comport
with the need to protect intelligence sources and methods and to
move swiftly so as to discourage an enemy with the military capability
to kill thousands of civilians. Military tribunals may be better adapted
than civilian courts to punish those who have taken up arms as members of terrorist groups. 175 Thus, in this current controversy, the
United States is advancing a position that has legal and policy
justification.
Beyond such a dramatic conflict, there is strong evidence of more
systemic differences between the United States and the ICRC-differences that may be important for how wars are fought in the future.
The ICRC recently published a massive study entitled Customary InternationalHumanitarianLaw, which seeks to codify the customary law of
humanitarian law. 176 The general counsels of the Department of
State and Department of Defense replied at length to this study, disputing its methodology and giving four examples of rules of humanitarian law proclaimed by the ICRC which it believed did not represent
internationally binding legal norms. 1 77 All of the disputes were examples of where the ICRC wanted to expand the reach of humanitarian
172 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
173 SeeJosh Kastenberg, The Customary InternationalLaw of War and Combatant Status: Does the Current Executive Branch Policy Determinationon Unlawful Combatant Statusfor
Terrorists Run Afoul of InternationalLaw, or Is It Just Poor Public Relations?, 39 GoNZ. L.
REv. 495, 532 (2004).

174 See supra Part III.C.
175 See John 0. McGinnis, Executive Power in the War on Terror, POL'Y REV., Dec.
2007-Jan 2008, at 63, 73.
176 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2005).
177 Letter from John Bellinger, III, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, & WillamJ.
Haynes, General Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Defense, to Dr. Jakob Kellenberger, President, Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross (Nov. 3, 2006), reprinted in 46 I.L.M. 514, 514-31
(2007) [hereinafter Letter from John Bellinger].
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obligations. For instance, the ICRC wanted to make it a war crime to
inflict "widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment" even when damage occurs as part of achieving a legitimate
military objective.' 78 As discussed above, given its mission and
orginazational interests, it is hardly surprising that the ICRC would
want to expand the reach of humanitarian law even at the expense of
179
effective war prosecution.
We also observe that U.S. State and Defense Departments' methodological complaints about the ICRC parallel the concerns we have
about the low quality of customary international law generally. For
instance, the United States complains that the ICRC unduly relies on
statements of the General Assembly and the ICRC itself as evidence of
state practice.' 8 0 We likewise regard such statements as "cheap talk"
because they do not show that states are actually following the practice
in question. The United States also complains that the ICRC does not
give much weight to negative practice, which parallels our concern
that states can be counted as affirmatively consenting to an international norm even if they object to it.181

Moreover, the United States argues that the report "fails to pay
due regard to the practices of specially affected states."' 82 This
includes, in particular, the United States. This objection also has
resonance with our concerns. The practices of the most affected
states would be far more probative than those not affected by particular rules at issue, because the talk of the former would be less "cheap."
We do not contend that all of the practices adopted by the
United States in the War on Terror are justified. Indeed, we have
previously criticized the Bush administration's excessive claims of
unbounded executive power, its detention policies for terrorism suspects, and its assertions that virtually any form of torture is legal if
ordered by the executive. 183 However, these flaws are best corrected
178 Id. at 520-21.
179 The United States was not the only nation that had substantial disagreements
with the ICRC. NATO disputed its conclusions with respect to the Kosovo intervention. See Larry Minear et al., NATO and HumanitarianAction in the Kosovo Crisis 66
(ThomasJ. Watson, Jr. Inst. for Int'l Studies, Occasional Paper No. 36, 2000), available
at www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/natokosovo36.pdf (describing differing and
sometimes conflicting interpretations of the Geneva Convention provisions between
NATO and the ICRC with respect to the Kosovo Crisis).
180 Letter from John Bellinger, supra note 177, at 515.
181 See id.
182 Id.
183 See, e.g., McGinnis, supra note 175, at 67-75; Posting of Ilya Somin to the
Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/1187914017.shtml (Aug. 23, 2007,
16:06 EST).
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by reliance on domestic legislative and judicial checks on executive
power rather than through reliance on international legal norms that
have not been ratified by the domestic democratic process. To some
extent, both Congress and the Supreme Court have already begun to
curb the Bush administration's excesses. 18 4 As this article goes to
press, the Bush administration's more controversial policies are under
review by the Obama administration, and some may well be modified
or reversed.
These examples illustrate that the democracy deficit has real consequences for human rights law and humanitarian law. International
human rights norms that try to impose contestable notions of rights
on matters that have few spillovers from one nation to another, like a
decision about whether to adopt comparable worth, usurp the proper
function of democratic nations and retard the process of demonstration and competition that a diversity of norms would provide. As the
examples of humanitarian law suggest, it is not at all clear that even
international norms that address matters with substantial spillover
effects are likely to strike a better balance than the domestic political
processes of democratic states.
V.

REPRESENTATION-REINFORCING RIGHTS: THE EXAMPLE OF FREE

MIGRATION

A.

Representation-ReinforcingRights

While we are generally skeptical of the desirability of using raw
international human rights law to displace the domestic law of democratic states, we believe representation-reinforcing rights are an exception. As discussed in the Introduction, this exception flows from our
theory. Democracy is itself an institution that depends on norms.
Because international human rights are best developed through democratic systems, 185 international norms that facilitate democracy have
a claim to be enforced domestically. In other words, the democracy
deficit objection to the enforcement of international human rights
loses force when those rights themselves directly provide the framework or infrastructure that allows citizens to exercise control over
184 In 2006, Congress enacted the McCain Amendment in response to the Administration's use of torture. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148,
div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 28, 42 U.S.C.). The
Supreme Court has repudiated the administration's claims of unbounded executive
power on several occasions. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 653 (2006)
(Kennedy, J., concurring); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 537-38 (2004) (plurality
opinion); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004).
185 See supra Part II.
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their governments. In such cases, the use of raw international law to
displace the domestic law making processes of democratic states may
serve to promote rather than to undermine democratic
accountability.
Of course, the exact content of representation-reinforcing rights
is open to debate. We believe that in order to qualify for domestic
enforcement these rights must contribute directly or substantially to
democratic control by citizens over their nations. It is not enough
that these rights are arguably beneficial in some other way, such as
contributing to human welfare or economic prosperity generally.
As we also noted in the Introduction, most democracies already
incorporate many representation-reinforcing rights, such as free
speech, into their constitutions. Thus, the most interesting question
posed by this conceptualization of domestically enforceable international human rights law is whether there are other important representation-reinforcing rights that liberal democracies do not yet
generally incorporate. For that reason, we choose to focus on the
rights of migration as examples of powerful democracy-reinforcing
rights that liberal democracies do not provide. As described below,
these rights actually strengthen popular leverage over government
policy by enabling more people to "vote with their feet."
We do not contend that broad migration rights are enshrined in
current international human rights law. It is quite clear that they are
not, although such rights would build on certain rights of emigration
and refuge that have recognition in international law. 186 But our
underlying normative contention is that international human rights
advocates should shift their efforts to developing rights, like rights of
migration, that facilitate people's leverage over their governments so
as to choose appropriate norms for themselves, instead of making that
choice for them by having international law enforce a thick set of substantive rights. Thus, it is not surprising that the example we choose is
not yet the most intense focus of concern in the international human
rights community.
Migration rights are not the only representation-reinforcing
mechanism that might be appropriately enacted at the international
law level. There may well be other examples. However, we show that
migration rights are an unusually compelling case because their beneficiaries generally have little or no representation in any existing
187
domestic democratic process.

186 See infia Part V.C.
187 For a more detailed defense of international migration rights as a democracy
enhancing measure, see Ilya Somin, Tiebout Goes Global: International Migration as a
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The Advantages of "Foot Voting"

One of the advantages of decentralized federalism is the ability of
citizens to "vote with their feet" and exit a jurisdiction whose policies
harm their interests by moving to one that has more attractive ones. 188
Even very poor and severely oppressed groups, such as blacks in the
Jim Crow era American South, have been able to take advantage of
18 9
exit rights to improve their lot.

In addition to providing a means for migrants to improve their
personal circumstances, exit rights also function as another tool for
imposing democratic control over government policy. Jurisdictions
that adopt harmful policies oppressing or impoverishing their citizens
risk losing valuable labor, capital, and tax revenue to jurisdictions with
more attractive policies. As a result, such governments have incentives
to change their policies to conform more closely with the interests of
their people. In some respects, such government accountability
through "exit" is actually more effective than traditional accountability
through voting and other forms of "voice."' 90 Often, citizens have
stronger incentives to acquire the information needed to effectively
"vote with their feet" than they do for purposes of traditional ballot
box voting. The latter are subject to a serious collective action problem that creates "rational ignorance," while the former are not.191
Tool for Voting With Your Feet, 74 Mo. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009) (symposium on federalism and international law).
188 For detailed discussion, see John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs.
States' Rights: A Defense of Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 89,
106-12 (2004); Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora'sBox of Federalism: The Case forJudicial
Restriction of Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461, 464-65 (2002);
Somin, PoliticalIgnorance, supra note 56, 1344-52.
189 See WILLIAM COHEN, AT FREEDOM'S EDGE 248-73 (1991); FLORETrx HENRI,
BLACK MIGRATION 51-66 (1975); David E. Bernstein, The Law and Economics of PostCivil War Restrictions on Interstate Migration by African-Americans, 76 TEX. L. REv. 781,
783-84 (1998).
190 For the distinction between exit and voice, see ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT,
VOICE, AND LOYALm 3-4 (1970). For arguments that exit is often a superior means for
imposing democratic control on government, see Somin, Political Ignorance, supra
note 56 at 1344-52.
191 See Somin, PoliticalIgnorance, supranote 56, at 1344-47. For a discussion of the
concept of rational ignorance, see Somin, Voter Ignorance, supra note 56, at 436. The
core idea is that voters have little incentive to acquire significant amounts of political
knowledge because the chance that any one vote will influence the outcome of an
election is vanishingly small. Thus, most citizens are "rationally ignorant," a conjecture supported by extensive polling data showing that most citizens know very little
about government and politics. For a survey of recent data, see Ilya Somin, When
Ignorance Isn't Bliss: How PoliticalIgnorance Threatens Democracy, POLICY ANALYSIS (Cato
Inst.), Sept. 22, 2004, at 1, 6-9, availableat http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa525.pdf.
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Most analyses of foot voting focus on migration within a single
nation, usually one with a federal system of government.' 92 However,
the idea is also applicable to international migration.
The vast majority of the population of the United States consists
of either immigrants or descendants of immigrants who came here
fleeing poverty or oppression that they experienced under their own
governments. From 1941 to 2000, the United States admitted 27.6
million legal immigrants and 3.5 million refugees. 193 Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, and Israel have also been prominent destina1 94
tions for immigrants fleeing hostile government policies.
For citizens of nondemocratic states-which still include the
majority of world's population-foot voting through emigration may
be the only way for them to have any say in the policies that they live
under. Obviously, such people include the vast bulk of the world's
poorest and most oppressed people.
C. Migration Rights in Current InternationalLaw
The importance of migration rights is partly recognized by current international law. Human rights treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal
19 5
Declaration of Human Rights recognize a right to emigration.
However, this "right to leave" has not been coupled with an equally
strong right to enter. Indeed, recent political trends have seen
renewed efforts to curtail entry into the United States, Australia, and
Western Europe. 19 6 Unfortunately, the right to leave may have little
value for potential migrants who have nowhere to go.
192 The classic work in the field is Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, 64J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
193 ROGER DANIELS, GUARDING THE GOLDEN DOOR 191, 235 (2004).
194 See U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Population Div., InternationalMigration
2006, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/256 (Mar. 2006), available at http://www.un.org/
esa/popuation/publications/2006MigrationChart/Migration2006.pdf.
195 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 29, art. 12;
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supranote 29, art. 13. For a complete survey
of international law on the right to leave, see Colin Harvey & Robert P. Barnidge, Jr.,
Human Rights, Free Movement, and the Right to Leave in International Law, 19 INT'L J.
REFUGEE L. 1 (2007).
196 See e.g., Margaret Kengerlinsky, Immigration and Asylum Policies in the European
Union and the European Convention on Human Rights, 12 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV. 101, 101

(2007) (noting the "fortress Europe" mentality and its recent impact on immigration
and asylum policy); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power

over Immigration,86 N.C. L. REv. 1557, 1591-92 (2008) (discussing the impact of September 11 on immigration and policy in the United States); Catherine Skulan, Australia's Mandatory Detention of "Unauthorized" Asylum Seekers: History, Politics, and Analysis
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Current international law, such as the 1951 Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees, requires states to grant entry to migrants
only if they have a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
-197 Even then states are only required to
or political opinion ....
refrain from expelling refugees once they have arrived within their
19 8
This
borders; they remain free to deny entry at the border.
E.U.
of
in
that
and
law,
approach is also followed in U.S. refugee
199
Thus, migration rights can be denied to potential immistates.
grants who have suffered the adverse effects of harmful government
policies without being specifically targeted for "persecution" on the
basis of any of the above categories. For example, a citizen of an
oppressive society cannot claim the right to enter the United States or
the European Union "merely" because the absence of free political
debate in his country leads to the enactment of harmful government
policies that reduce his or her well-being. He must prove that he has
been specifically targeted for persecution because of his opposition to
the government. Similarly, the law allows states to deny entry to "economic" migrants-even if their poverty is in large part due to flawed
policies enacted by their home governments.
Moreover, even in democratic states, domestic political processes
are unlikely to give full weight to the interests of potential immigrants.
By definition, such people are not yet citizens, do not have the right to
vote, and are unlikely to be able to exercise political influence in
other ways. Thus, political leaders can neglect their interests-or
even falsely blame them for alleged "harms" that they have not
caused-with relatively little fear of political retribution. It is therefore not surprising that anti-immigrant political movements have
flourished in both the United States and several European nations in
recent years, while parties seeking to increase immigration are rare.
Under International Law, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 61, 71-76 (2006) (discussing recent
developments in Australia).
197 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1.A(2), July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150.
198 This distinction underpins, for example, the U.S. "wet foot, dry foot" policy on
Cuban refugees under which they are allowed to stay if they arrive on U.S. soil, but
can be denied entry into the United States if intercepted by U.S. authorities at sea.
See Cuban-Americans Question 'Wet Foot, Dry Foot'Policy,NEwsMAx, Jan. 11, 2006, http://
archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2006/1 / 11/113342.shtml.
199 For a summary of U.S. law, see Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922, 924-25 (9th Cir.
2004). For a summary of EU law, see Rosemary Byrne et al., UnderstandingRefugee Law
in an EnlargedEuropean Union (Inst. Int'l Integration Studies, Discussion Paper No. 11,
2003),

available at

paper.pdf.

http://www.forcedmigration.org/events/prague2004/byrne-
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These problems reflect an "antiforeign bias" that routinely afflicts voters, causing them to underestimate the benefits of international trade
20 0
and migration, while overestimating its harms.
D. Democracy, Foot Voting, and the Case for an Expanded International
Right to Entry
From the standpoint of promoting democratic accountability
through foot voting, the distinction between victims of "persecution"
and other potential migrants makes little sense. Even potential
migrants who have not been targeted for persecution on the basis of
race, religion, or political, beliefs may still suffer the ill effects of
oppressive or misguided government policies. For example, repression of the right to freedom of speech and political organization
affects not only would-be speakers, but also all other citizens of the
society in question who are forced to live under a political process that
they have no right to influence.
Similarly, "economic" migrants are in many cases fleeing poverty
that is in large part caused by the flawed policies of the governments
they live under. Development economists have long recognized that
most poor countries could generate rapid economic growth by adopting appropriate policies, some as straightforward as enforcing the rule
of law. 20 1 Indeed just as political refugees are fleeing their nations

because they are targeted by discriminatory and fundamentally unjust
laws, so are economic migrants. The major reason that an immigrant
from a third world nation has greater earning power in a developed
nation is that free markets and the rule of law increase the value of his
20 2
human capital.
In many cases, enormous advances in the economic status of the
poor could be achieved simply by allowing them to acquire enforce200 For a detailed analysis, see CAPLAN, supra note 55, at 38-39.
201 For one of the most influential summaries of the evidence, see Jeffrey D. Sachs
& Andrew Warner, Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration, in 1 BROOKINGS

Acrivin' I (William C. Brainard & George C. Perry eds., 1995).
See also NATHAN ROSENBERG & L.E. BiRDZELL, JR., HOW THE WEST GREW RICH 20-32
(1986) (explaining how Western nations' greater prosperity relative to most other
states is primarily the result of innovative policy choices); Mancur Olson,Jr., Big Bills
Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some Nations Are Rich, and Others Poor,J. ECON. PERSP., Spring
1996, at 3, 13-15 (showing that policy choices have an enormous impact on the relative wealth or poverty of nations).
202 See generally Douglass C. North, Why Some Countries Are Rich and Some Are Poor,
77 CHI.-KENT L. Rv. 319, 320 (2001) (discussing systemic differences between rich
and poor countries).
PAPERS ON ECONOMIC
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and by integrating the nation in question more

closely with the world economy. 20 4 All too often, migrants who are
fleeing generally adverse economic and political conditions are no
less victims of their governments than those who have been targeted
for individualized "persecution" of the sort currently recognized as
grounds for asylum rights by international law. While migration rights
would be most useful for the poor in developing nations, whose exit
opportunities would allow them to pressure their own governments
for better policies, they may also be helpful to those in more advanced
societies, because citizens' enhanced ability to exit would provide
greater leverage against policies that aid special interests at the
20
expense of the public.

5

Some scholars have argued for stronger international migration
rights on deontological moral grounds. 20 6 Others advocate such
changes because they are likely to greatly increase the well-being of
migrants from repressive and underdeveloped societies, and also to
provide economic benefits to the societies that take them in. 20 7 We
sympathize with both claims. However, our purpose is to emphasize
an additional and generally ignored advantage of international migration rights: the opportunity to strengthen democratic accountability
by enabling more people to "vote with their feet" against repressive or
dysfunctional governments in their home societies. As in the case of
domestic federal systems, international foot voting allows citizens
greater choice over the government policies they live under, and provides them greater leverage to force states to adopt better policies in
order to prevent skilled migrants and valuable taxpayers from
departing.
203 See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (2000) (showing
how the poor in many third world countries suffer from their lack of enforceable
property rights).
204 See, e.g.,JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 52-64 (2004) (showing how free trade and openness to foreign investment provide enormous benefits to
the world's poorest citizens).
205
Cf William J. Carney, The PoliticalEconomy of Competitionfor Corporate Charters,
26J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 315 (1997) (explaining exit in the corporate context).
206 See, e.g., Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Casefor Open Borders, in THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP 229, 241 (Ronald Beiner ed., 1995); Jonathon W. Moses, Two
(Short) Moral Arguments for Free Migration, 2 ANVENDT ETIKK VED NTNU 25, 25-30
(2003).
207 See, e.g., LAtr' PRITCHETr, LET THEIR PEOPLE COME 2-3 (2006);Jonathon Moses
& Bjorn Letnes, If People Were Money: Estimatingthe Gains and Scope of Free Migration, in
POVERTY, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND ASYLUM 188 (George J. Borjas & Jeff Crisp
eds., 2005).
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Unlike many other types of international law, a right to free
migration does not undermine the ability of democratic states to
adopt diverse approaches to various policy issues. States with free
entry and exit rights can still enact a wide range of different policies,
so long as they do not inhibit freedom of movement without strong
justification. Indeed, as scholars of domestic federalism have emphasized, freedom of movement might stimulate policy innovation by governments, as they compete for economically valuable migrants.2 0 8
We do not claim that our argument justifies an "open borders"
international law norm. Even in combination with the moral and economic case for free migration rights, it will not outweigh all possible
justifications for restricting immigration in particular instances. Thus,
an international immigration rights norm would still allow nations to
restrict the numbers and kinds of immigrants they receive when they
20 9
have a justification for doing so.
Indeed, in some cases, free migration could actually undermine
democratic governance. For example, it is possible that the rapid
immigration of a large group hostile to liberal democracy could result
in the election of a governing party that would undermine the very
liberties that make the country in question attractive to immigrants in
the first place. In such a scenario, restrictions on immigration may be
necessary to maintain democratic government despite the very real
harms that they cause. 2 10 Nevertheless, international law migration
rights would be an important thumb on the scale in democratic
2z 1
nations, pushing in favor of more liberal immigration policies .
208 See, e.g., GEOFFREY BRENNAN &JAMES M. BucHANAN, THE POWER TO TAx 172-86
(1980); ALBERT BRETON, COMPETITIVE GOVERNMENTS 31-34 (1996); ALBERT BRETON &
ANTHONY ScoTt, THE DESIGN OF FEDERATIONS 13-19 (1980); THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM 1-31 (1990);James M. Buchanan, Federalism as an Ideal PoliticalOrder
and an Objectivefor ConstitutionalReform, PUBLIUS, Spring 1995, at 19, 19-23; Wallace E.
Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1120, 1134-37 (1999);
Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions:Efficiency Enhancing or DistortionInducing?, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 333, 335-42 (1988); Tiebout,
supra note 192, at 418-20; Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of PoliticalInstitutions:
Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 5-6
(1995); Ralph Winter, Private Goals and Competition Among State Legal Systems, 6 HAR%'.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 127, 129-30 (1982).

209

In this Article we do not consider the issues raised by national decisions to

deport people for illegal entry.
210 We do not believe that either the United States or most European nations are
currently faced with such a threat.
211 We do not necessarily believe that international norms should be directly
enforced by the judiciary. As discussed supraPart I, there are a variety of methods by
which international law can be integrated into domestic law, including as independent authority for imposition of rules by domestic executive branch agencies and leg-

2009]

DEMOCRACY

AND

INTERNATIONAL

HUMAN

RIGHTS

LAW

1793

The importance of foot voting does not provide a comprehensive
blueprint for international migration law. It does, however, provide
an important and generally overlooked consideration in favor of
broadening international rights to entry and exit. At the very least, we
should consider the possibility of enacting much stronger entry rights
for migrants fleeing states with nondemocratic governments where
foot voting is the only practicable way for most citizens to choose the
government policies they wish to live under.
E. Migration Rights as a Form of Representation-Reinforcing
InternationalLaw
Our defense of international migration rights on the ground that
they foster democratic choice raises the question of whether the same
argument might justify the overriding of domestic law by other international law norms. In the domestic sphere, a variety of arguments
have been made to justify the overriding of seemingly majoritarian
legislative enactments on the ground that doing so promotes representation-reinforcement in other ways. 2 1 2 Similar arguments could be
made in the international sphere. For example, some scholars claim
that the absence of anti-hate speech laws may "silence" racial minori2 13
ties and reduce their ability to participate in the political process.
Others argue that proportional representation (PR) systems are more
democratic than first past the post ones. 2 14 Perhaps, therefore, imposition of hate speech norms or PR electoral systems through international law might facilitate representation reinforcement.
There are, however, three important reasons why there is a
stronger representation-reinforcement argument for imposing migration rights on democratic states than other possible international law
norms. First and most important, migration rights facilitate the representation of people who have no voice whatsoever in existing democratic processes in entry states. In the case of those whose states of
origin are nondemocratic, they lack any representation in any democratic process anywhere. This situation is qualitatively different from
that of citizens of established democracies, who generally have at least
some substantial voting rights, even if imperfect ones. One possible
islatures. The comparative advantages of different enforcement mechanisms will vary
depending on the norm in question.
212 The classic work is of course ELY, supra note 7. For citations to more recent
literature, see Somin, PoliticalIgnorance, supra note 56, at 1352-70.
213 See, e.g., MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND 93-96 (1993).
214 See generally AREND LIJPHART, PATrRNS OF DEMOCRACY 301-09 (1999) (arguing
for proportional representation over majoritarian democracy).
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analogy within a democracy is the situation of black Americans in the
Jim Crow era South, at a time when they were denied the right to vote.
Yet even they could potentially gain that right by migrating to the
North, as many in fact did. 215 By contrast, citizens of nondemocratic

nations have no hope of gaining the franchise unless they are allowed
to migrate to a democracy.
Second, most potential representation-reinforcing reforms for
democratic states are subject to serious disagreement on the merits. It
is far from clear, for example, that PR is really more democratic in a
meaningful sense than first past the post. By definition, a mature
democracy is likely to already provide those representation-reinforcing policies whose democracy promoting elements are beyond serious
contestation. Therefore, there is a strong case for avoiding the imposition of a single, unitary international rule on widely controversial
aspects of the democratic process.
Obviously, migration rights are also highly disputed on a variety
of grounds. However, there is little if any doubt that extending them
would promote democracy from the standpoint of the migrants,
whose ability to choose the form of government they live under would
be greatly increased. As noted above, we are willing to accept restrictions on migration rights where migration would undermine democracy by introducing an extremely large population of immigrants
2 16
hostile to basic liberal democratic values.
Finally, an additional reason for giving preference to migration
rights is the truly enormous gains in human well-being that might
result from enabling residents of poor and undemocratic regimes
freer access to more advanced and more liberal societies. The income
gains alone are staggering. 2 17 A Mexican worker immigrating to the
United States, for example, can expect a permanent two-to-sixfold
218
increase in his or her wages.
Gains in protection for basic human rights are potentially even
greater. Numerous governments engage in extensive repression of
ethnic, religious and other types of minority groups. Often, the
repression exceeds anything found in liberal democratic states. In the
most extreme (but far from uncommon) cases, genocide and mass
murder have led to the deaths of over 200 million people during the
past century. 2 19 Lesser but still severe forms of group repression also
215 See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
216 See supra Part V.D.
217 For estimates of the income gains, see PRITCHETT, supra note 207, at 18-22.
218 COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 191 (2007),
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/2007/2007_erp.pdf.
219 See generally RUMMEL, supra note 105, at 1-28 (compiling the data).
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abound under authoritarian and totalitarian governments. If even a
small fraction of those suffering from such abuses can avail themselves
of the opportunity to migrate to freer societies, the potential human
rights benefits would be enormous.
Some might contend that the poorest and most oppressed are
unlikely to be able to migrate. That will certainly be true in the case
of many people. However, history shows that even severely oppressed
people often emigrate if allowed entry by liberal democratic states.
Examples include the Vietnamese and Cambodian "boat people" who
220
fled highly oppressive totalitarian regimes in the 1970s and 1980s.
Recent studies show that a liberalization of immigration regimes by
advanced nations would lead to enormous wage gains by migrants
from many of the world's poorest countries. 22 1 Not all of the world's
poor and oppressed populations are mobile; but enough are to
ensure that freer international migration would lead to major benefits
for them.
Some of the potential representation-reinforcement gains from
migration rights could be realized even if the migrants were not
granted full citizenship rights by their host countries, and were
instead brought in as temporary guest workers. Such migrants could
still greatly increase their economic well-being and be able to "vote
with their feet," thereby exercising some choice over the policies they
wish to live under. 222 Guest worker programs in Germany, Singapore,
and elsewhere have offered valuable opportunities to migrants from
poor countries. 2 23 These programs extend migration rights to citizens
of poor and oppressed societies without allowing them to dilute the
voting power of current residents of liberal democratic states.
There may well be other representation-reinforcing reforms that
could be imposed on democracies through international human
rights law that are similar in nature to migration rights. We do not
contend that the migration rights are the only representation-reinforcing norm that could ever be legitimately generated by interna220 See generally NGHIA M. VO, THE VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE, 1954 AND 1975-1992
(2005) (discussing the causes and dynamics of their flight).
221 See, e.g., PRITCHETr, supra note 207, at 2-4, 18-22; Moses & Letnes, supra note
207, at 188.

222

For a variety of proposals along these lines, see

PRITCHETr,

supra note 207, at

42-44.

223

See, e.g.,

RITA CHIN, THE GUEST WORKER QUESTION IN POSTWAR GERMANY

38-41

(2007) (describing massive and longstanding German guest worker programs); Kerry
Howley, Guests in the Machine, REASON, Jan. 2008, at 20, 22-33 (describing benefits of
guest worker programs in various countries, focusing especially on Singapore's extensive program).
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tional law. We do, however, suggest that migration rights are an
unusually strong candidate because of the way in which they provide a
voice for those who otherwise lack any access to representation, and
the truly enormous size of the benefits they create.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

We have argued that raw international human rights law should
generally not be given the authority to alter the domestic human
rights law of democratic states. This conclusion flows naturally from
the democracy deficit of all raw international law, which makes it
likely that its norms will generally be less beneficial than those of
domestic law generated by democratic processes. In the case of
human rights law, international lawmaking processes are particularly
suspect because of the extensive influence of repressive
nondemocratic governments who have an interest in suppressing
human rights rather than promoting them.
While it may not be desirable for international human rights law
to provide rules of decision in the domestic law of democracies, our
analysis points to a different conclusion for nondemocratic states. In
many cases, international human rights law norms may well be superior to the domestic law of dictatorships. In the extreme case of totalitarian states that suppress virtually all human rights or engage in mass
murder,2 24 almost any set of legal rules is likely to be preferable to
those enacted by the state's domestic rulers.
This factor points to the possibility that we should strive for an
asymmetric system of international human rights law: one that regulates dictatorships more strictly than democracies. While traditional
international law has historically sought to treat all states as possessing
equal rights and obligations, the merits of this stringent perspective in
the field of human rights law seem dubious. In particular, there may
be a much stronger case for imposing substantive legal norms (as
opposed to those that merely facilitate democratic processes) through
international law on dictatorships than on democracies. Of course,
the governments of such nations are unlikely to enforce human rights
directly against themselves. But outside institutions, including international tribunals, may well be justified in enforcing international
human rights norms that displace the nation's own norms, when such
institutions have jurisdiction over a matter. While we cannot fully
expound on the strengths and weaknesses of an asymmetric system of
224

See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
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international human rights law in this article, the possibility merits
22 5
further inquiry.
Obviously, the role of nondemocratic states in influencing the
content of international human rights law is a major obstacle to the
creation and enforcement of rules that would impose meaningful constraints on such states. Thus, reform efforts will have to focus on limiting the influence of such states on the content of international
human rights norms, as well as on ensuring that the resulting laws will
be adequately enforced against them. The issues involved are complex, and we cannot even begin to resolve them here. Their consideration is, however, a logical extension of our analysis that should be
undertaken in future research.
We are not wholly negative about the contribution international
law can make to human rights even in democratic nations. For
instance, if nations ratify future human rights treaties and make them
self-executing within their domestic systems, we do not object to their
enforcement. Under those circumstances the proclamation of such
norms would not be "cheap talk" and the content of the treaties is
likely to be no worse than that of ordinary domestic law because they
have to pass through the same legislative processes. The European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is perhaps a system of international legal norms that exemplifies some of the potential of international law created by democratic states that then embody it in their
own domestic law. The ECHR was drafted and signed by a set of overwhelmingly democratic nations, and has since served as a means of
curbing a number of human rights abuses through litigation in the
European court system. 226 A few nondemocratic nations, most notably Russia, have joined the ECHR system and ECHR litigation may
have helped curb abuses in that country. Recently, Russian President
Dmitri Medvedev called for legal reform in Russia in order to reduce
the number of Russian cases going to the European Court on Human
Rights in Strasbourg. 22 7 If the ECHR really does succeed in forcing
improvements in Russian human rights practices, it would be a
225 We also note that nations transitioning to democracy with weak law-creating
institutions may choose to create mechanisms to enforce international law against
themselves. See Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and
InternationalLaw, 38 N.Y.U. J. INr'L L. & POL. 707, 712 (2006).
226 For recent analyses, see A EUROPE OF RIGHTS (Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet
eds., 2008) (compiling assessments of the impact of the ECHR on European legal
systems).
227 See Medvedev: Russia Must Improve Courts, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 3, 2008, at A3.
Russian cases have accounted for a remarkable twenty percent of the European Court
of Human Rights' total caseload since 1998. Id.
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notable example of a system of international norms set up by democratic states improving human rights in a nondemocratic society, as
well as in the democratic states themselves. In these respects, the
ECHR contrasts with international human rights regimes where the
228
influence of nondemocratic states is stronger.
International human rights law can potentially play a useful role
in limiting the abuses of nondemocratic governments and perhaps in
promoting norms that enhance citizens' control over their governments, such as promoting international mobility. But it also has serious shortcomings that should make us wary of allowing it to displace
the domestic lawmaking process of democratic states.

228

See supra Part III.A.

